Attorney General v Scotcher

Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 creates a clear prohibition on disclosing statements, opinions, arguments or votes arising during jury deliberations. It contains no implied exception for a juror who believes that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. The rule protects candid deliberation, juror privacy and the finality of verdicts. Concerns about misconduct or an unsafe conviction should be raised with the trial judge or through the appellate process. The restriction is compatible with Article 6, and any interference with expression is justified.

The Attorney-General applied to commit the respondent for contempt after he sent the mother of defendants in a criminal trial a letter disclosing his vote, jurors’ views and arguments during deliberations, and alleged reasons for the verdict. The respondent argued that section 8 should contain an exception for disclosure motivated by a genuine concern about a miscarriage of justice.

The issues were whether the letter breached section 8(1), whether an exception was required by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and whether the respondent’s concerns justified the disclosure.

1. Contempt established. The letter disclosed particulars of statements, opinions, arguments and votes made or cast during jury deliberations. It therefore constituted a clear and deliberate breach of section 8(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.

2. The statutory wording is clear and prohibits disclosure of details of jury discussions or voting. The common-law rule is at least as wide: jury deliberations are sacrosanct, and courts will not receive evidence about discussions in the jury room or the reasons for a verdict.

3. No implied exception applies where a juror genuinely believes that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. Such an exception would require investigation into the genuineness and substance of the concern, permit minority jurors to seek a new trial, undermine verdict finality, and impair the candour and privacy necessary for jury deliberations.

4. The jury system contains safeguards against misconduct. A juror with concerns during trial may raise them with the judge. Complaints about the evidence, the judge’s directions or an unsafe conviction are matters for the appellate process. Cases concerning extrinsic influences on a jury did not authorise disclosure of deliberations after the trial.

5. Section 8 is compatible with Article 6. The risk that misconduct within deliberations may go undetected is a consequence accepted in order to preserve the integrity of trial by jury. Any restriction on expression was justified, and Article 10 did not assist the respondent. The Attorney-General’s application succeeded.