Case details
Summary
An unsigned response to a statutory request for driver information does not satisfy Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, section 12(1)(b), because the statutory evidential shortcut requires a statement purporting to be signed. The response may nevertheless be admissible as a confession where the evidence permits the court to infer that the defendant made it. A caution is unnecessary where the request seeks information under a statutory requirement. Admission of the response in a speeding case is compatible with Article 6. It may establish a case to answer, but only if it is properly admissible against the defendant as the maker. A conviction founded on the erroneous section 12 approach must be quashed; remittal is appropriate where a rehearing remains fair and possible.
Factual background
These were two appeals by way of case stated concerning speeding convictions based on returned section 172 forms. Michael Mawdesley’s form identified him as the driver but contained no signature, and the Warrington Justices admitted it under section 12(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. Dwight Yorke’s form was similarly unsigned. The Crown Court upheld his conviction after accepting evidence that an agent had completed the form with Yorke’s authority.
The High Court considered whether an unsigned form could satisfy section 12, whether it could nevertheless be admitted as a confession, whether a caution or Article 6 prevented admission, and whether the evidence could establish a case to answer.
Held
- Mawdesley: The handwritten name in block capitals did not amount to a signature for section 12(1)(b). The form’s design, including the blank spaces for signature and date, prevented an inference that the name was intended to operate as a signature. The Justices therefore erred, and the conviction was set aside.
- An unsigned section 172 form may nevertheless be admissible independently of section 12. If the evidence permits the court to infer that the defendant made the entries, the form is a confession within section 82(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and may be proved under section 27 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
- The section 172 request fell within the statutory-requirement exception in Code C 10.1, so no caution was required. Following Brown v Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817, admitting an incriminating answer obtained under section 172 in a speeding case was not disproportionate or incompatible with Article 6.
- In both cases, the surrounding evidence permitted an inference that the forms had been completed by the appellants. Such evidence was capable of establishing a case to answer where the identity of the driver was the only disputed issue.
- Yorke: The prosecution had not advanced its case on the confession basis. Yorke therefore had no opportunity to challenge admissibility by showing that the form had been completed by his agent. Once that evidence was accepted, the form was not Yorke’s confession. His conviction was set aside and was not remitted because no other evidence could establish the driver’s identity.
- Mawdesley’s case was remitted to the Warrington Justices for rehearing. Costs for both appellants were ordered from central funds, to be taxed if not agreed.
The court’s approach to earlier authorities
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Appellate history
- Warrington Justices: Convicted Mawdesley of speeding and admitted the unsigned form under section 12(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.
- Manchester Magistrates Court: Convicted Yorke of speeding.
- Manchester Crown Court: Dismissed Yorke’s appeal and upheld the conviction.
- High Court (Administrative Court): Set aside both convictions; remitted Mawdesley’s case to the Justices and declined to remit Yorke’s case.
Key cases cited
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