Francis v Director Of Public Prosecutions

Under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, a chief officer of police may impose reasonable requirements governing how information identifying a vehicle driver must be provided. That may include a requirement that the response be written and signed. A signature authenticates the information and is consistent with section 12(1) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. An unsigned or otherwise incomplete response may therefore fail to satisfy section 172(2). Code C does not require a caution where questions seek information under a statutory road-traffic requirement. The appeal was dismissed because the appellant had not clearly authenticated the statement that he was the driver.

The appellant was convicted by Aldershot Magistrates’ Court of failing to provide information identifying the driver of his Jaguar, contrary to section 172(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. A camera had recorded the vehicle exceeding the speed limit. The appellant returned the police form with his particulars, driver number and date, but did not sign the section stating that he had been driving.

By case stated, the magistrates asked whether the appellant was guilty where he had failed to sign a reply to a notice served under section 172(7). The central issues were whether the police could require a signed response and whether a caution was required before seeking the information.

1. Disposition. The court answered the magistrates’ question in the affirmative and dismissed the appeal with costs.
2. Requirement of a signature. Section 172(2) empowers a chief officer of police to require information identifying the driver. Section 172(7) permits that requirement to be made by written notice. By necessary implication, the officer may prescribe reasonable requirements governing the manner of response. Those requirements may include that the information be supplied in writing and authenticated by signature, following Boss v Measures [1990] RTR 26.
3. The signature was not an additional item of driver information outside section 172(2). It was a normal means by which the keeper authenticated the written information. Section 12(1) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 also showed that Parliament contemplated a written statement purporting to be signed by the accused. The fact that the two provisions appeared in different Acts was immaterial because they were enacted at the same time and addressed the same subject matter.
4. Application to the form. The returned form did not clearly establish who had completed it or authenticate the statement that the appellant was the driver. The absence of a signature therefore constituted non-compliance with the section 172(2) requirement. The court confirmed the approach in DPP v Broomfield [2002] EWHC 1962 (Admin).
5. Caution. Code C:10.1(b) permits questions seeking information under a statutory requirement without a caution. In context, the word “other” in that provision could mean further or additional necessary purposes. Code C:10.9 did not apply to this situation. The court therefore accepted the reasoning in Mawdesley and Yorke v Chief Constable of Cheshire [2003] EWHC 1586 (Admin) that no caution was required.

• High Court (Administrative Court). The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal by case stated and upheld the conviction and costs order made by Aldershot Magistrates’ Court.
• Aldershot Magistrates’ Court. On 20 October 2003, the magistrates convicted the appellant under section 172(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and imposed a fine and costs.