Hurst v Coroner Northern District of London

The procedural duty under Article 2 to investigate a death is a free-standing and continuing obligation. It may apply to a coroner’s later decision even where the death occurred before the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, if the challenged decision was made afterwards. The relevant threshold is whether the material arguably disclosed that public authorities knew or ought to have known of a real and immediate risk to an identified person’s life from criminal acts, and failed to take measures which might reasonably have avoided it. A reviewing court should decide arguability, not determine the merits or strength of the underlying case. Other investigative processes may be taken into account, but they do not necessarily remove the need for an inquest.

Troy Hurst was killed by Albert Reid in May 2000. An inquest was opened and adjourned under section 16(1) of the Coroners Act 1998 because Reid had been charged with murder. After Reid’s conviction for manslaughter, the Coroner refused to resume the inquest under section 16(3).

Christine Hurst sought judicial review of both the original refusal and a further refusal made in June 2003. The issues included whether Article 2 applied to the later decisions despite the date of death, and whether the evidence arguably disclosed a breach of the Article 2 operational duty by the police or local authority.

1. Application of Article 2. The procedural duty to investigate under Article 2 is ancillary to the right to life but is also free-standing. It is continuing and remained a live issue when the Coroner made his decisions in 2002 and 2003. Accordingly, the fact that the death occurred before October 2000 did not prevent Article 2 from governing the later decisions. Khan ([2003] EWCH 1414, Admin) was wrongly decided on that point.
2. Coroner’s functions. The Coroner was required to conduct the inquest under the Coroners Act 1998 and Coroners Rules 1984, while also acting compatibly with Convention rights under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. He had no freestanding obligation to hold an Article 2 investigation, but had to construe and apply the inquest rules compatibly with Article 2 where the inquest formed part of the State’s investigative response.
3. Arguable breach. The question was whether there was sufficient evidence to establish an arguable breach: whether one or both interested parties knew or ought to have known of a real and immediate risk to Troy Hurst’s life from Reid, and failed to take measures which might reasonably have been expected to avoid it. The threshold was high, but the extensive evidence of threats, violence, mental instability, warnings and failures of communication raised arguable issues under both limbs of the test in Osman v United Kingdom (29 EHRR 245).
4. Scope of review and outcome. The court was not entitled, having heard no witnesses, to assess the ultimate strength of the case against the police or local authority. The Coroner’s material errors and his conclusion that there was no evidence of an arguable Article 2 breach made the refusals unlawful. His decisions were quashed and he was ordered to resume the inquest. The claimant was awarded costs against the Coroner. Permission to appeal was refused.

Hooper J granted permission for the judicial review claim. The claim was then heard by the Divisional Court, which allowed it, quashed the Coroner’s refusals and ordered that the inquest be resumed.