Williams, R (on the application of) v Horsham District Council

Whether a dwelling is a person’s sole or main residence is determined by evaluating all relevant circumstances. Factors may include the intention to return, the period and reason for absence, legal interest, security of tenure, personal belongings, the residence of family members and official registrations.

A tribunal must give those factors their proper weight. It must not elevate one or more factors into overriding rules of law. Where it has adopted that erroneous approach, the reviewing court should ordinarily remit the matter for a lawful factual decision rather than substitute its own assessment.

Mr Williams appealed against the decision of the West Sussex Valuation Tribunal dated 11 December 2002. The Tribunal had dismissed his appeal against Horsham District Council’s refusal to grant a 50 per cent council tax discount for Pump Cottage.

Between January 1993 and July 1997, Mr Williams and his wife lived in employer-provided accommodation at Hurstpierpoint College while Pump Cottage was left unoccupied. The Tribunal found that they intended to return to Pump Cottage and retained security of tenure there, but concluded that Pump Cottage remained their sole or main residence. The central issue was whether the Tribunal had applied the correct legal approach and given proper weight to all relevant factors.

1. Appeal allowed and matter remitted. The question whether Pump Cottage was the claimant’s sole or main residence had to be reconsidered by the Valuation Tribunal. The court was not the fact-finding tribunal and should not substitute its own view of the facts.
2. Under the approach in Edwards v Bairstow [1956] AC 14, intervention was justified where the decision disclosed an error of law or where no properly instructed tribunal could have reached it.
3. The relevant issue required consideration of all the circumstances. Relevant factors included the intention to return, the period and reason for absence, the legal interest in the dwelling, security of tenure, the location of personal belongings, the residence of a spouse or children and official registrations. The authorities concerning work-related accommodation, including Ward v Kingston-Upon-Hull City Council [1993] RVR 71, Doncaster Borough Council v Stark [1998] RVR 80 and Bradford Metropolitan City Council v Anderton 89 LGR 681, did not establish that any one factor was conclusive.
4. The Tribunal had identified the relevant factors, including the distinguishing features that the claimant’s wife lived with him at the college and that neither of them stayed overnight at Pump Cottage. However, it appeared to have treated security of tenure and the intention to return as overriding legal criteria. That was an error of approach. Those factors required proper weight, but they were not trump cards.
5. Bennett v Copeland Borough Council [2003] EWHC 990 (Admin) illustrated that not living at a property was only one factor; the significance of the remaining circumstances depended on the findings made in the particular case.
6. The matter was remitted for the Tribunal to decide which property was the sole or main residence after giving proper weight to all relevant factors. An order was also made for the claimant’s expenses as a litigant in person, subject to quantification. Permission to appeal was granted if the court had power to give it.

• West Sussex Valuation Tribunal: On 11 December 2002, dismissed the claimant’s appeal concerning the refusal of a 50 per cent council tax discount.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Allowed the statutory appeal and remitted the matter to the Tribunal for reconsideration according to law.