Bennett v Copeland Borough Council

Whether a dwelling is a person’s sole or main residence is a question of fact and degree. The assessment must consider all relevant circumstances. The time spent at the dwelling is relevant but is not decisive. Ownership, the right to return, connections with the dwelling, work-related absences and intentions may all be relevant. A person need not live regularly at a dwelling for it to be his sole or main residence. However, the absence of any actual residence remains a factor. On an appeal on a question of law, the High Court will not substitute its own view of the facts or interfere with findings that are not legally erroneous or perverse.

George Bennett appealed against a decision of the Bedfordshire Valuation Tribunal concerning his liability for Council Tax on Woodville Cottage under section 6 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992. The Tribunal found that the property was his sole or main residence, although he lived a nomadic working life, visited the property only occasionally and let other people occupy it. It therefore treated him as the resident freeholder within the statutory liability hierarchy.

The appeal raised questions about the meaning of sole or main residence, the significance of Mr Bennett’s never having lived at the property, whether the occupiers were tenants, the admissibility of new tenancy documents, and the Tribunal’s findings concerning discounts.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Tribunal’s decision was confirmed. The appeal was limited to questions of law. The Tribunal had asked itself the correct question, adopted the proper approach and made findings of fact that were not susceptible to challenge for perversity.
2. “Sole or main residence” has no statutory definition in the Local Government Finance Act 1992. It is a question of fact and degree. The court must consider all the circumstances. The length of time spent at a property is only one factor and is not decisive. The authorities, including Frost (Inspector of Taxes) v Feltham, [1981] 1 WLR 452, Bradford Metropolitan City Council v Anderton, 89 LGR 681, and Ward v Kingston upon Hull City Council, [1993] RA 71, supported that approach.
3. The fact that Mr Bennett had never lived at the property did not determine the issue. It was a relevant factor, to be considered alongside his freehold interest, the absence of another property in which he had a financial interest, his right to return, his occasional visits, the possibility of returning if work commitments ceased, and the Tribunal’s finding that he intended to retire there.
4. The Tribunal’s observation that its conclusion would have differed if the occupiers had formal tenancies with exclusive possession did not establish that such tenancies existed. A tenancy may be created orally, but exclusive possession is essential to a tenancy of a corporeal hereditament: Street v Mountford, [1985] AC 809. There was no finding that the occupiers had been granted exclusive possession.
5. Written tenancy agreements produced for the first time on the appeal were inadmissible. The first condition in Ladd v Marshall, [1954] 1 WLR 1489, was not satisfied because the documents had been available for use before the Tribunal.
6. There was no proper basis for challenging the Tribunal’s findings concerning discounts. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs, to be assessed if not agreed.

The appeal was brought from a decision of the Bedfordshire Valuation Tribunal under regulation 32 of the Valuation and Community Charge Tribunals Regulations 1989. The High Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the Tribunal’s decision.