T v Director of Public Prosecutions & Anor

Reporting restrictions under section 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 apply only while the person concerned remains a child or young person as defined by the Act. They do not continue merely because the proceedings began while that person was under 18. The provision must be construed in its statutory context and purposively, having regard to its protective purpose. Since it restricts the general freedom to report court proceedings and creates a criminal offence, any ambiguity should be resolved in favour of that freedom. The court’s discretionary powers to dispense with anonymity also support an interpretation under which the restrictions fall away when the person becomes an adult.

This was a case stated appeal from the South Shields Magistrates’ Court. T had been 17 when proceedings began in the Youth Court, but turned 18 before pleading guilty and being sentenced to a four-month Detention and Training Order. The magistrates concluded that section 49 no longer prevented publication identifying him and therefore did not consider whether to exercise the discretion under section 49(4A). T challenged that conclusion, arguing that the reporting restrictions continued throughout the proceedings. The central issue was whether section 49(1) ceased to apply when a defendant concerned in Youth Court proceedings attained 18.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The magistrates had correctly answered the stated question in the affirmative.

2. Although proceedings begin when a child or young person is first brought before the Youth Court, section 49 does not prohibit all reporting of those proceedings. It prohibits publication identifying a child or young person concerned in them. Once the person becomes an adult, the statutory condition is no longer satisfied.

3. The purpose of section 49 is to protect the welfare of children and young persons from the adverse consequences of publicity. That purpose does not extend to protecting them after they have become adults. The reference to a person’s name, address or school also makes it strained to apply the restriction to an adult.

4. Section 49 must be read with the rest of the Act. The language of sections 49(4A) and 49(5) presupposes a person who is presently a child or young person. Continuing the restriction after the person reached 18 would create corresponding gaps in the discretionary provisions.

5. The international and Convention background considered in McKerry v Teesdale and Wear Valley Justices was of limited assistance because that case concerned the exercise of a discretion, not the statutory construction in issue here. The reporting restriction should also be narrowly construed because it limits open justice and creates a criminal offence.

• High Court (Administrative Court): the case stated appeal was dismissed and the magistrates’ answer was affirmed.
• South Shields Magistrates’ Court: on 16 April 2003, concluded that section 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 no longer applied after T attained 18.