Pearl v Kings Lynn Youth Justices

The statutory right of a child or young person to anonymity in Youth Court proceedings may be lifted where the court is satisfied that this is in the public interest. The power must be exercised very rarely, carefully and for a proper protective purpose, rather than as punishment or naming and shaming. A Youth Court is not required to postpone its decision until sentence or until every later piece of information is available. Where identification is justified for public protection, the person’s address may also be relevant. The decision is subject to intensive judicial review, including rationality and proportionality scrutiny, but the reviewing court must respect the Youth Court’s evaluative judgment.

The claimant, who was aged 17 when charged, pleaded guilty to dangerous driving and related offences after driving at high speed the wrong way along a dual carriageway. A collision caused injuries to police officers and to others, and resulted in the loss of the child carried by a seriously injured passenger.

Kings Lynn Youth Justices ordered under section 49(4A) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 that the claimant’s anonymity be lifted. The order was stayed pending judicial review. The claimant argued that the decision was premature, irrational and disproportionate, and that a more limited order should have been considered.

1. The application for judicial review was refused. The Youth Court had not erred in lifting the claimant’s anonymity.
2. Section 49(4A) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 permits anonymity to be dispensed with where the court is satisfied that this is in the public interest. The guidance in McKerry v Teesdale & Wear Valley Justices [2000] 164 JP 335 required great care, caution and circumspection. Such cases would be very rare. The power could not properly be used as an additional punishment or for naming and shaming.
3. The Youth Court was entitled to regard identification as capable of protecting the public by enabling the claimant to be reported if he drove before being legally permitted or properly trained. That reasoning was rational and permissible. The possibility that publication might also have an adverse, unintended consequence did not invalidate the decision.
4. It would have been open to the Youth Court to defer the decision until after sentence and to reconsider it when further information was available. That course was not mandatory. The stay also left scope for a further application.
5. The argument for a more limited order lacked force. Once lifting anonymity was permissible for public protection, the claimant’s place of residence was relevant and could properly be taken into account.
6. The court declined to determine whether the claimant had lost anonymity on reaching 18, having regard to T v Director of Public Prosecutions and North East Press Limited [2003] EWHC 2408 (Admin). A possible future change under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act did not assist interpretation of the law then in force.

• High Court (Administrative Court): the claimant sought judicial review of the Youth Court’s order lifting anonymity. The application was refused.