Director of Public Prosecutions, R (on the application of) v Camberwell Green Youth Court

The statutory scheme governing mode of trial provides for a single decision by the magistrates’ court. That decision cannot be reconsidered merely because new facts emerge or the court later considers that the original decision was wrong. A change is permitted only in the circumstances expressly specified by section 25 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, during the summary trial or committal proceedings. Magistrates have no additional inherent jurisdiction to reopen the issue. Policy arguments favouring flexibility cannot enlarge statutory powers. Earlier dicta suggesting a wider power were not followed in the consistent later authorities.

The Director of Public Prosecutions challenged two decisions of Camberwell Green Youth Court concerning the mode of trial for charges against young defendants. The court had decided that certain indecent-assault charges should be tried summarily, although related and more serious charges were committed to the Crown Court. It later refused to reverse those decisions.

A voluntary bill of indictment resolved the immediate procedural difficulty. The DPP therefore pursued declaratory relief concerning whether, under sections 18 to 25 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, a magistrates’ or youth court may change its mode-of-trial decision before the summary trial or committal proceedings have begun.

1. Claim refused. The court refused the declaration sought. The immediate problem had already been resolved by a voluntary bill of indictment, and the court nevertheless determined the underlying legal question.
2. The statutory scheme for adults and persons under 18 runs in parallel. Sections 20 and 24 provide for the court’s decision as to mode of trial. Each scheme contemplates a single decision, not serial reconsideration of the same issue, whether or not new material subsequently emerges.
3. Section 25 specifies the circumstances in which the court may change its decision. For adults, subsections (2) and (3) apply during the summary trial or committal proceedings. For juveniles, subsections (5) to (7) provide corresponding powers. The statutory language does not permit a general power to reopen the decision before those stages.
4. The court rejected the argument based on R v Craske, ex parte Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1957] 2 QB 591. That decision concerned an earlier statute and exceptional circumstances involving withdrawal of an uninformed consent to jury trial. It could not justify overturning two decades of consistent authority on the 1980 Act.
5. The court also rejected reliance on inherent jurisdiction. The abuse-of-process jurisdiction recognised in R v Horseferry Road Magistrates' Court, ex parte Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42 did not address mode of trial. The residual appellate jurisdiction recognised in Taylor v Lawrence [2002] EWCA Civ 1990; [2003] QB 528 belonged to an appellate court near the apex of the system and had no application to magistrates.
6. Although the policy arguments for flexibility had considerable force, policy could not extend the statutory powers. The obiter dicta in R v Newham Juvenile Court, ex parte F (A Minor) [1986] 1 WLR 939, suggesting review where circumstances changed, had been repeatedly disapproved and were not adopted.

Lord Justice Rose agreed. Leave to appeal was refused, and a question was certified.

not stated in the judgment.