W v Warrington Magistrates Court

In deciding whether a person under 18 should be committed for trial, the court must apply the statutory test in section 24(1)(a) of the Magistrates Court Act 1980. The central question is whether, having regard to the defendant’s age, there is a real prospect that a sentence of two years or more may be required. The general policy favouring trial in the Youth Court remains relevant, particularly for younger defendants, but administrative arrangements cannot displace the statutory right to a Crown Court trial where the statutory conditions are met. A decision under section 24 is ordinarily a single decision on mode of trial. The court has no general power to reconsider it merely because new material later emerges, although section 25 provides specified powers to change course during summary proceedings.

W, aged 14 at trial and 13 when the offences were committed, challenged convictions in the Youth Court for attempted rape and three sexual assaults. He argued that the attempted rape charge should have been committed to the Crown Court under section 24(1)(a) of the Magistrates Court Act 1980, and that the judge should not have tried the later sexual-assault charges after trying the attempted-rape charge or considering a joinder application.

The Divisional Court considered the June 2008 decision not to commit, the absence of a renewed committal application before trial, the judge’s power to hear the separate charges, and delay in bringing the judicial-review claim.

1. Disposition. Permission to apply for judicial review was granted, but the application was refused. The claim was not defeated by delay.
2. The Youth Court’s decision not to commit the attempted rape charge was justifiable under section 24(1)(a) of the Magistrates Court Act 1980. The statutory test required consideration of whether, having regard to W’s age, there was a real prospect that he might require a sentence of, or in excess of, two years. The court was entitled to consider his age, the complainant’s age, his lack of previous convictions, and the legislative policy that children should, wherever possible, be tried in the Youth Court.
3. The full seriousness of the offending emerged only later, through the evidence and pre-sentence report. The later sentence could not retrospectively establish that the earlier decision was unlawful. The decision was therefore within the discretion of the Youth Court and disclosed no error of principle or absence of material supporting it.
4. The statutory test could not be displaced by the 2007 protocol concerning rape cases in the Youth Court. Administrative arrangements may encourage the use of a Circuit Judge sitting as a District Judge, but they cannot defeat the statutory right to a Crown Court hearing where section 24(1)(a) applies.
5. Following R (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Camberwell Green Youth Court and C, W, K and A [2003] EWHC 3217 (Admin), the court had no general power to revisit the earlier mode-of-trial decision merely because new material had emerged. Sections 25(5) and 25(6) identify the circumstances in which a Youth Court may change its decision during summary proceedings.
6. The judge was entitled to try the later sexual-assault charges. Different complainants and circumstances did not make the second trial unfair, and the judge’s earlier findings did not require recusal. His prior consideration of joinder was likewise no bar to trying the attempted-rape charge.

This was an application for permission to apply for judicial review of decisions made by Warrington Youth Court. The Divisional Court granted permission but refused the substantive application.