D v L & Ors

The forfeiture rule applies to all forms of unlawful killing, including manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility or provocation. Relief under the Forfeiture Act 1982 is discretionary and requires the court to be positively satisfied that justice requires modification of the rule. Diminished responsibility does not, by itself, justify relief. The court must assess all material circumstances, including culpability, the nature and gravity of the offence, the relationship between offender and deceased, the deceased’s intentions, the estate, the offender’s financial position, and the claims of those who would otherwise benefit. The discretion is directed to whether justice requires modification, not simply to showing compassion for the offender.

The claimant had been convicted of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility after killing the deceased by strangulation. He was the principal beneficiary under the deceased’s will and sought an order modifying the forfeiture rule so that he could benefit from the estate and resume occupation of the deceased’s former home.

The deceased’s family opposed the application. The central issue was whether, having regard to the conduct of the offender and deceased and all other material circumstances, the justice of the case required relief under section 2(2) of the Forfeiture Act 1982.

1. The application was refused. The forfeiture rule applied because the claimant had unlawfully killed the deceased. Following Dunbar v P. [1998] Ch 412, the rule applied to all cases of unlawful killing, including manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility or provocation. The only possible exception identified was criminal insanity resulting in an acquittal.
2. Section 2(2) of the Forfeiture Act 1982 required the court to be positively satisfied that justice required modification. The Act did not provide relief merely because the killing involved diminished responsibility, and section 5 excluded murder. The appropriate approach was to consider the whole circumstances rather than divide the estate according to a general concept of doing justice between the parties.
3. The relevant considerations included culpability, the nature and gravity of the offence, the relationship between offender and deceased, the deceased’s intentions, the size and value of the estate, the offender’s financial position, and the moral claims and wishes of those otherwise entitled to benefit.
4. The claimant’s responsibility for the killing had been reduced but not extinguished. He had continued to live with the deceased despite knowing his own susceptibility to stress, had exploited the deceased’s vulnerability, and had spent substantial sums for his own benefit. Those matters, together with the deceased’s family relationships and interests, meant that justice did not require modification of the rule.