Amos v Mancini & Ors

The forfeiture rule applies to unlawful killing by causing death by careless driving, as it does to manslaughter. The absence of deliberate or intentional conduct does not create an exception. Where application of the rule would produce injustice, the remedy is an order under the Forfeiture Act 1982, rather than excluding the case from the rule. The court must consider the offender’s conduct, the deceased’s conduct and all other material circumstances. Modification is justified where forfeiture would be significantly out of proportion to the offender’s culpability and the resulting loss.

The claimant negligently caused the death of her husband in a road accident. She had pleaded guilty to causing death by careless driving under section 2B of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and received a suspended custodial sentence and driving disqualification. Her husband’s will left his estate to her, and their jointly owned home would otherwise have passed to her by survivorship.

The claimant sought a declaration on the application of the forfeiture rule and, if applicable, modification under section 2 of the Forfeiture Act 1982. The central issues were whether the rule applied to causing death by careless driving and whether justice required its effect to be modified.

1. Application of the rule. The forfeiture rule, recognised in section 1 of the Forfeiture Act 1982, applies where a person has unlawfully killed another and would otherwise acquire a benefit in consequence of the killing. The authorities, including Dunbar v Plant, Dalton v Latham, Re Land Deceased and Chadwick v Collinson, establish that the rule applies to all cases of manslaughter.
2. The reasoning that all manslaughter involves causing death by criminal conduct applied equally to causing death by careless driving. There was no logical distinction between manslaughter involving little more than inadvertence and the statutory offence committed by the claimant. The forfeiture rule therefore applied.
3. Modification under section 2. The court was required to consider the claimant’s conduct, the deceased’s conduct and other material circumstances, and could modify the rule only where the justice of the case required it.
4. The claimant’s lapse of concentration was significant, but lasted only moments and occurred after a long and difficult journey in poor conditions. She had pleaded guilty at the first opportunity. The home had been acquired and developed by both spouses with the intention that the survivor should take it. The deceased’s will remained the best evidence of his testamentary intentions, and the relevant beneficiaries had not contested the claim.
5. Forfeiture of the claimant’s interest in the home and the testamentary gift would be significantly out of proportion to her culpability. Justice therefore required modification of the rule so that she could take her husband’s interest in the home and inherit under the will. A draft minute of order was directed to be submitted within seven days.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate history was stated in the judgment.