British Sugar Plc v Cegelec Ltd

Appellate courts should be slow to interfere with trial judges’ case-management decisions concerning late evidence. In deciding whether to admit such evidence or adjourn a trial, the judge may consider its availability at an earlier stage, the lateness and likely prejudice, the effect on the trial timetable, and whether suitable evidence is already available from an independent expert. Where the evidence concerns a theory previously available to the party and not prompted by newly emerging facts, refusing permission may be justified. On factual causation, a reasoned and tenable finding that one of two possible causes is more likely than the other is sufficient on the balance of probabilities.

British Sugar claimed consequential loss after an alternator at its factory failed. The claim concerned whether the failure resulted from migration of the rotor end windings, following an earlier refurbishment, or from detached heat-sink fins. The High Court, sitting in the Salford Technology and Construction Court, found for British Sugar on liability in a reserved judgment dated 6 February 2004.

Cegelec appealed on factual merits and challenged the refusal to admit further evidence from Mr Regan or to adjourn the trial. The central issues were whether the trial judge had properly exercised his case-management discretion and whether his findings on causation were open to him.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lord Justice Hooper gave the judgment. Lord Justices Parker and Pill agreed.
2. The refusal to admit substantial further evidence from Mr Regan, and the refusal to adjourn, were case-management decisions within the trial judge’s discretion. Mr Regan had been available for years and the theory in his statement had previously been advanced internally. The evidence was disclosed only shortly before trial, would require further investigation, risked significant prejudice to British Sugar, and was likely to require a substantial adjournment. Professor Williamson’s supplemental report provided independent evidence capable of addressing the theory. The judge was therefore entitled to conclude that admitting Mr Regan’s evidence would not advance the interests of justice (paras [46]-[52]).
3. The procedural challenge was not strengthened by the fact that British Sugar’s experts had produced supplemental evidence. This was not a case in which the claimant had introduced a new theory at the last moment. The late theory had emerged from Cegelec’s own case, after Cegelec had pleaded the heat-sink theory without earlier producing supporting material (paras [39]-[45], [54]).
4. On the merits, the trial judge was entitled to reject the heat-sink theory. The absence of consequential damage, aluminium debris and corresponding damage to other components supported that conclusion. Having excluded the only alternative cause advanced by Cegelec, the judge was entitled to find that migration of the windings had caused the failure, relying on the expert evidence and the earlier unexplained migration (paras [25]-[32]).
5. Where only two possible causes are advanced, a tenable and reasoned finding that the claimant’s cause is more likely satisfies the civil standard of proof. The judge’s subsidiary findings concerning the refurbishment and the application of the VPI process could not affect the outcome, even if challenged (paras [26], [31]-[32], [54]).

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 7 October 2004, dismissed Cegelec’s appeal. [2004] EWCA Civ 1450
2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, Salford Technology and Construction Court: HHJ Raynor QC found for British Sugar on liability in a reserved judgment dated 6 February 2004. No citation for that judgment is stated in the judgment.