Bluett v Suffolk County Council & Ors

A local authority’s statutory powers and duties do not, without more, create or reinforce a common-law duty of care. The court must first determine whether the statute creates a private-law right of action. If it does not, duty is governed by ordinary common-law principles, including assumption of responsibility and reliance.

On a strike-out or summary-judgment application, a fact-sensitive negligence claim should proceed where the pleaded case is viable and disclosure or oral evidence may materially affect the assessment. A claim should be stopped only where it has no real prospect of success or there is another compelling reason. Injury suffered while escaping an anticipated physical attack is not necessarily too remote.

The claimant, aged 16, suffered catastrophic injuries after jumping from a third-floor room at a hostel for young people while escaping an attack by other residents and visitors.

She sued Suffolk County Council and other defendants. Her claim against the Council alleged negligence and breach of statutory duty arising from its involvement in advising and assisting her to obtain accommodation. The statutory-duty claim was not pursued.

A Master struck out or summarily dismissed the claim against the Council. Poole J dismissed the claimant’s appeal, holding that duty, breach and causation were unsustainable. The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the claim disclosed a viable common-law duty of care and had a real prospect of success, or whether it had been prematurely determined on an incomplete evidential record.

1. Appeal allowed. May LJ held that the claimant had a pleadable negligence case against the County Council, and Scott Baker LJ agreed. Permission to amend was granted in principle within the framework identified by the court.
2. Applying Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15 and Sandhar v Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions [2004] EWCA Civ 1140, the Council’s statutory duties and powers formed background only. The Children Act 1989 did not create a private-law right of action on the accepted case. Such statutory duties could not parasitically reinforce a common-law duty of care.
3. Ordinary common-law principles applied, including reliance and assumption of responsibility. The proposed case was that the claimant relied on the Council’s social worker for help and advice in obtaining suitable accommodation, and that he assumed responsibility to take reasonable care. The scope of that responsibility depended on whether it extended to guarding against the loss claimed.
4. The claimant needed a real prospect of establishing that the social worker knew or ought to have known that the hostel exposed a young person such as her to a significant risk of serious physical attack. If that risk were established, injury caused while escaping the attack would not necessarily be too unforeseeable or remote.
5. The lower courts had effectively conducted a mini-trial before disclosure. The evidence did not show that all substantial facts reasonably capable of being before the court were available. Disclosure concerning the hostel, its security, and possible drink or drug problems might strengthen the case. The claim might fail, but it was not bound to fail.
6. The amendment was to be tendered by 14 January 2005. If the Council did not object within 14 days, it could be made without further order; any objection was to be determined by a Queen’s Bench Master.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): allowed the claimant’s second appeal against Poole J’s dismissal of the claim against Suffolk County Council. Permission to amend was granted in principle.
• Queen’s Bench Division, Poole J: dismissed the claimant’s appeal against the Master’s order concerning the County Council.
• Queen’s Bench Division, Master Leslie: struck out or summarily dismissed the claim against the County Council under rules 3.4 and 24.2 of the CPR.