Loveridge & Loveridge v Healey

A court ordinarily determines whether statutory or contractual preconditions to relief are satisfied under the usual rules of evidence and civil procedure. A clear admission of the necessary facts may therefore establish those preconditions. The court must decide the case consistently with an admission on the pleadings unless permission is granted to withdraw it.

An allegation that a notice called for a specified breach to be remedied is factual, although it has legal consequences. It must be addressed in the defence and may be deemed admitted under rule 16.5(5) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. If a party seeks to contest an admitted fact, the court must determine an application to amend, taking account of statutory protection, lateness and prejudice.

The owners of a protected mobile-home site sought a declaration terminating an occupier’s contractual licence and possession of his pitch. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 to the Mobile Homes Act 1983, implied into the agreement, required service of a notice to remedy a breach, non-compliance within a reasonable time and a judicial finding that termination was reasonable.

The pleaded defence accepted the matter of the notice alleged by the owners, although the parties later accepted that the identified letter was not a notice requiring the breach to be remedied. A recorder nevertheless gave summary judgment for the occupier, holding that the statutory protection required the court to recognise the absence of a valid notice. Beatson J dismissed the owners’ first appeal.

The central questions were whether the defence admitted the subject matter of the notice, whether rule 16.5(5) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 applied, and whether the court could disregard the admission without amendment.

1. Appeal allowed. The defence admitted receipt of a notice calling upon the occupier to remedy the pleaded immobility of the mobile home. That was the only coherent construction of the pleading when read with the allegations that the requested works had been carried out.

2. The allegation about the contents and effect of the notice was an allegation of fact, although it had important legal consequences. It was therefore an allegation with which the occupier was required to deal under rules 16.5(1) and (2) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998. Had it not been addressed expressly, rule 16.5(5) would have treated it as admitted.

3. The statutory scheme protected mobile-home occupiers by implying mandatory contractual terms under section 2(1) and Schedule 1 to the Mobile Homes Act 1983. It did not make satisfaction of those terms a condition of the court’s jurisdiction. The owners had to establish contractual preconditions to termination through the ordinary rules of evidence and civil procedure.

4. More generally, statutory preconditions to possession cannot be created merely by an agreement that the occupier will surrender possession. They may, however, be established by a clear admission made in pleadings or by consent to judgment. The court determines such preconditions as it determines other substantive issues.

5. The recorder could not disregard the pleaded admission merely because material before him showed that it was factually untrue. Until amendment, the judge could neither rely on inadmissible material nor decide contrary to the admission. The proper course was to require the occupier to apply for permission to amend and then decide that application on all material considerations.

6. Permission to amend was not inevitable. Relevant considerations included the importance of the statutory protection, the prejudice caused to the owners by a very late amendment, and whether the absence of a written remedial notice had caused prejudice to the occupier. The summary judgment was set aside. The occupier would need permission to amend before relying on the failure to serve the required notice.

Buxton LJ agreed. He added that parties cannot determine a question of law by agreement, although they may agree facts from which the law yields only one answer. Thomas LJ also agreed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The owners’ second appeal was allowed and the summary judgment was set aside: [2004] EWCA Civ 173.
2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Beatson J dismissed the owners’ appeal on 31 July 2003.
3. Worcester County Court: On 24 April 2003 Mr Recorder Evans gave summary judgment for the occupier on the part of the claim based on breach of the licence agreement.