Gheisari v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In assessing credibility, a fact-finder may take account of the inherent probability or improbability of an account. Improbability alone does not establish that the account is untrue. The decision-maker must evaluate the evidence as a whole, including the witness, available background material and any explanations.

Reasons must show that this evaluative task was performed. An adjudicator may expressly adopt coherent reasons in a refusal letter, but any inadequacy in those reasons will then affect the adjudicator’s decision. Brief reasons may suffice where they disclose an independent assessment of truthfulness, although fuller reasons should ordinarily be given on an issue central to an asylum claim.

The appellant, an Iranian national, claimed asylum after entering the United Kingdom clandestinely. He said that, following his conversion from Islam to Zoroastrianism, the Iranian authorities arrested and ill-treated him before his friends secured his escape. The Secretary of State rejected the account as incredible.

An adjudicator dismissed the asylum and human rights appeals. The adjudicator gave very brief reasons for rejecting the alleged arrest, ill-treatment and escape. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal upheld that decision, finding that the adjudicator had adopted the Secretary of State’s reasons and had adequately stated his findings.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal on the ground that the material concerning his personal risk had not been adequately appraised. The central issue was whether the adjudicator had independently assessed the truthfulness of an inherently improbable account and given sufficient reasons for rejecting it.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The adjudicator’s reasons were slender and regrettably brief, but they were just sufficient to disclose an independent assessment of the appellant’s truthfulness.

2. Per Sedley LJ, with whom Thomas LJ agreed, a fact-finder addressing an account said to be inherently improbable must distinguish two questions: how probable or improbable the account is, and whether it may nevertheless be true. Conversely, an inherently probable account may be untrue. The required inquiry concerns whether the event occurred, rather than merely whether it was likely to occur.

3. Thomas LJ emphasised that credibility assessment must be logical and careful. Where inherent improbability is the principal reason for rejecting an account, the fact-finder must address separately whether the account is nevertheless true and must make the reasoning on each question clear.

4. Pill LJ agreed with the governing warning but qualified the description of a mandatory two-stage process. Fact-finding is essentially a single, holistic process and must not be compartmentalised or performed by rote. The fact-finder should consider the evidence as a whole, including country information, the assessment of the witness, the explanations given and the varying likelihood of different parts of the account. It would be erroneous to conclude that evidence must be false simply because it is inherently unlikely.

5. An adjudicator may expressly adopt coherent reasons stated in a Home Office refusal letter after independently considering the issue. Those reasons then become the adjudicator’s reasons, but any inadequacy in them will also affect the adjudicator’s decision. Here, the statement that the evidence lacked the ring of truth went beyond merely echoing the Secretary of State’s incredulity and expressed the adjudicator’s own assessment of veracity.

6. The adjudicator had heard the appellant’s oral evidence and was entitled to reject the central account of arrest and escape. Although a summary of the relevant evidence and fuller reasoning should normally have appeared, the reasons given were legally sufficient. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): By [2004] EWCA Civ 1854, dismissed the appellant’s appeal and upheld the Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s decision.

2. Immigration Appeal Tribunal: Dismissed the appeal. It held that the adjudicator had adopted the Secretary of State’s reasons and that the findings of fact were sufficiently considered and stated.

3. Adjudicator: Dismissed the appellant’s asylum and human rights appeals after rejecting his account of arrest, ill-treatment and escape.