Denson v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions & Anor

The right of access to a court under Article 6 is not absolute. A procedural time limit is compatible with that right where it pursues legal certainty and finality, leaves the essence of access intact, and bears a reasonable relationship of proportionality to that aim. A regime allowing an appeal within 28 days, with extensions for special reasons, and an outer limit of 13 months provided adequate protection. A court should not disapply such a limit merely because a litigant in person found the legislation complex or was unaware of available remedies, particularly where the litigant had relevant experience and had been told of the right of appeal.

Mr Denson challenged child maintenance decisions following a departure direction and a revised maintenance assessment. His first appeal was dismissed by the Child Support Commissioner, and this court refused permission to appeal on 28 June 2000. He later sought a review or revision of the relevant decisions. The Child Support Appeal Tribunal effectively refused that application on 18 December 2001, and the Child Support Commissioner dismissed his further appeal on 21 February 2003.

Mr Denson renewed his application for permission to appeal and sought an extension of time. He argued that the applicable appeal provisions and time limits under the Child Support Act 1991 and associated regulations prevented a fair hearing contrary to Article 6. The central issue was whether the late appeal could proceed and whether the time limits were Convention-compliant.

Application dismissed unanimously. The technical challenge to the time limit and the Article 6 argument had no realistic prospect of success. Costs were to be assessed if not agreed.

1. The court construed the statutory and regulatory scheme. Under the original Child Support Act 1991 provisions, an appeal could be brought within 28 days, with a power to extend time for special reasons under the Child Support Appeals Tribunals (Procedure) Regulations 1992. The later Social Security and Child Support (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 1999 provided a one-month period, permitted extensions under regulation 32, and imposed an absolute limit of one year after expiry of the ordinary appeal period. Transitional provisions preserved the former rules for specified pre-1 June 1999 decisions only where the application was made before 1 July 2000.
2. Applying the principles stated in Stubbings v UK [1996] 23 EHRR 213, Ward LJ held that Article 6 permits limitations on access to a court where the essence of the right is preserved, the limitation pursues a legitimate aim, and the means bear a reasonable relationship of proportionality to that aim. Time limits pursue legal certainty and finality.
3. The relevant periods were proportionate. The applicant had an available appeal route, permission and extension mechanisms, and up to 13 months in which to bring the late appeal. The fact that he was acting in person, and found the legislative scheme difficult, did not justify disapplying the limit. His experience of the appeal process and the warning that he had a right of appeal were material.
4. Time ran from the decision sought to be appealed, not from the conclusion of later appellate proceedings. The proposed appeals concerning decisions made in June and December 1998 were therefore substantially out of time.

Chadwick LJ and Laws LJ agreed. Laws LJ added that the Convention arguments were conspicuously lacking in merit.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 15 March 2004 the court dismissed the renewed application for permission to appeal and the associated application for an extension of time.
2. Child Support Commissioner: On 21 February 2003 the Commissioner dismissed Mr Denson’s appeal from the Child Support Appeal Tribunal’s decision of 18 December 2001, which had effectively refused the requested revision or review.
3. Child Support Appeal Tribunal: The tribunal had refused the later application as out of time. An earlier tribunal decision of 15 June 1998 concerning a departure direction had been followed by dismissal of an appeal by the Commissioner on 28 July 1999.
4. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 28 June 2000 the court refused permission to appeal against the earlier Commissioner’s decision.