Bennetts v Ministry of Defence

Under the Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992, an employer’s statutory duties depend on a relevant risk of injury, but liability still requires a causal connection between any breach and the injury. A risk identified after an accident does not establish causation unless it corresponds to the mechanism of injury. The court left open whether the statutory threshold requires reasonable foreseeability because the injury resulted from a novel act of lifting a partly emptied bag after it snagged on a trolley. The injury was not caused by the ordinary risks of stooping, carrying or the bag’s weight. Even if there had been a breach in assessment, training or procedures, it would not have prevented the injury. The appeal was dismissed.

Hazel Bennetts, a civilian Ministry of Defence employee, injured her back while attempting to lift a partly emptied mail sack onto a trolley after items in the sack had become stuck. She brought claims in negligence and under the Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992.

Mrs Recorder Dowell rejected the claim at Taunton County Court on 29 September 2003. She found that the ordinary mail-handling operation did not involve a relevant real risk, and that the risks identified in a later assessment did not cause the accident. The appeal challenged those findings, the absence of training, alleged negligence in packing the sack, and the assessment of contributory negligence. The central issue was whether any breach of statutory or common-law duty caused the injury.

1. Appeal dismissed. Rix LJ delivered the leading judgment and Carnwath LJ agreed. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.
2. Rix LJ held that the question whether the normal mail-handling operation involved the initial risk required by regulation 4(1)(a) could be left open. The guidance in Koonjul v Thameslink, [2000] PIQR 123 at 126, treated the relevant risk as a real risk or foreseeable possibility rather than a probability, while recognising the need for realism. Whether reasonable foreseeability was additionally required was not decided.
3. The later assessment identified risks principally associated with stooping and carrying. Those risks were not the mechanism of this injury. The injury arose from the sack snagging on the trolley during an unusual, one-off lifting manoeuvre. Accordingly, even if the Ministry had breached duties to assess the operation, provide training or alter procedures, no causal connection with the injury was established.
4. Given the imprecise factual findings and the trial judge’s difficulties with the appellant’s credibility, the Court of Appeal was not justified in overturning the recorder’s causation finding. The recorder was entitled to assess the whole evidence, notwithstanding evidence from a manager suggesting that training might have avoided the accident.
5. The common-law negligence argument concerning the packing of the sack also failed. There was no finding explaining how the sack came to be in its condition, and negligence could not be inferred as a matter of law merely from that condition. In any event, the same causation difficulty remained. The issue of 60 per cent contributory negligence therefore did not arise, although Rix LJ considered the recorder entitled to make that assessment.
6. Carnwath LJ added that the statutory language was the primary criterion. His discussion of Hawkes v London Borough of Southwark, [1998] EWCA Civ 310, indicated that even a slight risk may engage regulation 4 and that the threshold may be lower than the common-law negligence threshold. This additional guidance was unnecessary to the result because causation was absent.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): In [2004] EWCA Civ 486, the appeal from the Taunton County Court was dismissed. The court upheld the recorder’s conclusions on statutory risk and causation.
• Taunton County Court: Mrs Recorder Dowell decided the claim on 29 September 2003, finding no relevant statutory breach causing the injury and addressing contributory negligence.