Girbash v Main Line Auto Engineering Ltd

An appellate court should rarely interfere with a trial judge’s finding on the balance of probabilities where the judge directed himself correctly, evaluated the evidence as a whole and heard the principal witnesses. A booking for a vehicle service may support an inference that the vehicle was taken in, but the inference depends on all the circumstances. Causation may be established by circumstantial and expert evidence. A defective brake can be an effective cause where it materially contributes to loss of control, even without direct evidence of braking or skid marks.

The claimant suffered serious injuries when a van she was driving collided with an oncoming vehicle. She alleged that the defendant garage had agreed to service the van shortly before the accident but failed to identify or repair a defective rear offside brake.

The High Court, after a liability-only trial, found that the van had been taken to the garage for servicing and that the defective brake caused or materially contributed to the accident. The defendant appealed. The central issues were whether those factual findings were properly open to the trial judge and whether the defective brake caused or contributed to the collision.

By a majority, the appeal was dismissed. Clarke LJ gave the leading judgment and Jacob LJ agreed. Mance LJ dissented.

1. Appellate review. The trial judge had correctly applied the burden of proof and had assessed the oral and documentary evidence in its context. His assessment of Mrs Leicester and Mr Ridley was entitled to particular weight because the Court of Appeal had not seen or heard them. The fact that an appellate judge might have reached a different conclusion did not justify interference. Reversal of a properly directed trial judge’s finding of fact should be rare.
2. Whether the van was serviced. The matching diary entries, the booking, the claimant’s methodical preparations, the telephone records, her later account to her mother and the surrounding circumstances cumulatively entitled the judge to infer that she took the van in and collected it. The absence of garage records was not conclusive because Main Line undertook cash jobs which might not be recorded. Even if the claimant had told an earlier minor lie about arranging the service, that did not by itself establish that she later lied about the service having occurred.
3. Causation. The evidence supported a finding that the claimant applied significant braking before the first violent swerve. Expert evidence showed that the defective rear brake could cause directional instability. The absence of skid marks and direct evidence of braking was not decisive. The defective brake materially contributed to the loss of control and was therefore an effective cause of the collision. Any additional steering error did not prevent liability, and Main Line did not advance contributory negligence.
4. Dissent. Mance LJ agreed that the defective brake caused or contributed to the accident but considered the evidence insufficient to prove that the van had been taken in for servicing. Relying on Rhesa Shipping Co. SA v Edmunds (The Popi M) [1985] 1 WLR 948 and related authorities, he considered that the claimant’s case failed where the central evidential issue remained unresolved and no positive finding in favour of Main Line was required.

The appeal was dismissed. The claimant received her appeal costs, with costs after 3 March 2004 assessed on the indemnity basis subject to the stated rate limitation.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) [2004] EWCA Civ 614: by a majority, dismissed Main Line’s appeal and ordered it to pay the claimant’s appeal costs.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division: His Honour Judge Hegarty QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, found on 14 July 2003 that the van had been taken in for servicing and that the defective brake caused or materially contributed to the accident. Permission to appeal was refused by the judge but later granted by Kay LJ.