Lloyd-Wolper v Moore & Ors

For the purposes of Road Traffic Act 1988 section 151(8)(b), a vehicle owner permits use when consent is actually given, even if it rests on an honest but mistaken belief that the driver is insured or holds a valid licence. A misrepresentation inducing that belief does not itself negate permission.

Permission may instead be conditional. If the owner makes consent subject to fulfilment of a condition, no statutory permission arises unless the condition is met. Whether a condition exists depends on the evidence. An owner must make it sufficiently plain, although it may be inferred from the circumstances.

The insurer was obliged to satisfy third-party claims arising from a collision caused by the insured owner’s son. The son was outside the motor-trader policy because he had no valid driving licence and, when driving for pleasure, used a vehicle exceeding the policy’s 1600cc limit.

The insurer recovered the payments from the owner under Road Traffic Act 1988 section 151(8). A District Judge granted summary judgment. His Honour Judge Charles Harris QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, dismissed the owner’s appeal. The owner appealed again, contending that his consent was conditional on his son having a valid licence, or was vitiated by his son’s alleged misrepresentation.

The central issue was whether the owner had caused or permitted the uninsured use within section 151(8)(b).

1. Disposition. The Court unanimously dismissed the appeal and upheld summary judgment for the insurer. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal.
2. Meaning of permission. Pill LJ held that Road Traffic Act 1988 section 151(8)(b) should give “permitted” the same meaning as “permits” in section 143(1)(b). Both provisions occur in the same Part and concern compulsory third-party insurance. The criminal authorities therefore supplied the relevant distinction. A consent expressly subject to an unfulfilled condition is not permission, as illustrated by Newbury v Davis [1974] RTR 367. By contrast, consent given in the honest but mistaken belief that insurance or a valid licence exists remains permission, as Baugh v Crago [1975] RTR 453 showed.
3. Mistake and misrepresentation. Pill LJ rejected the submission that a mistaken belief induced by the proposed driver’s misrepresentation should be treated as an unfulfilled condition. Contractual remedies for misrepresentation did not alter the statutory allocation of responsibility for third-party liabilities. The alleged misrepresentation, even assumed in the appellant’s favour, neither created nor evidenced a condition on his permission. He accordingly had no arguable defence and the District Judge had correctly entered summary judgment.
4. Conditional consent. Whether consent is conditional is a question of evidence. A condition may be inferred from circumstances, but an insured person will generally be in a stronger evidential position if the condition is expressed clearly. The severe financial consequences of section 151(8) did not justify a different construction.
5. Engine-capacity ground. Pill LJ added, with whom Sir William Aldous agreed, that permission to drive the over-capacity vehicle independently brought the use within section 151(8). Rix LJ agreed that the appeal failed on the principal issue, but considered that, if misrepresentation could negate all permission to drive, the capacity restriction would not independently establish permission. That disagreement did not affect the result.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division). In the present judgment, [2004] EWCA Civ 766, the court dismissed Charles Moore’s appeal and upheld summary judgment for the insurer.
• Deputy High Court Judge. On 19 September 2003, His Honour Judge Charles Harris QC dismissed Moore’s appeal from the District Judge.
• District Judge. On 30 April 2003, District Judge Matthews entered summary judgment for National Insurance Guarantee Corporation plc for £189,295 and costs.