Bridgestart Properties Ltd v London Underground Ltd

A reference to the Lands Tribunal for disputed statutory compensation is an action to recover a sum within section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1980, ordinarily subject to a six-year period running from entry. Negotiations about damage do not, without more, prevent an acquiring authority relying on limitation. Estoppel by convention requires a shared assumption, including an assumption of law, to have been communicated between the parties. A letter offering to consider repair-cost claims within a specified period will not waive limitation unless it clearly addresses the statutory time limit or communicates non-reliance on it. Estoppel cannot create a separate cause of action; the claim remains statutory.

London Underground Limited acquired subsoil beneath the appellant’s listed building for the Jubilee Line extension. The appellant later claimed compensation for injurious affection under section 63 of the Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, applied by section 24 of the London Underground Act 1992. The Lands Tribunal held that the reference was statute-barred because more than six years had elapsed from entry.

The appellant appealed, contending that London Underground was estopped, or had waived its limitation defence, through a 1994 letter and subsequent negotiations concerning settlement damage. The central issue was whether that conduct prevented reliance on the statutory limitation period.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Lands Tribunal was right to hold the reference statute-barred. Section 9(1) of the Limitation Act 1980 applied, and the six-year period ran, at the latest, from entry on 29 July 1994. The reference in October 2002 was therefore out of time.
2. The ordinary measure of compensation for injurious affection under section 63 of the Land Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, like section 7 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965, is diminution in the value of the retained land. Section 63 can extend to injury caused by both execution of authorised works and their subsequent use. The 1994 letter proposed a different method for settlement damage, namely reasonable repair costs, and a separate process for considering such claims. It did not address references to the Lands Tribunal or imply that statutory limitation would be waived.
3. Continuing negotiations before and after expiry of the limitation period did not of themselves create an estoppel. The Court followed Hillingdon London Borough Council v A.R.C. Limited (No.2) [2000] RVR 283: a shared assumption of law had to be communicated, including communication that the authority would not rely on a statutory limitation defence.
4. No equitable estoppel or waiver was established. The letter’s two-year period, measured from opening of the railway extension, was not shown to have appeared inconsistent in 1994 with the statutory six-year period. The statutory limitation rule had been established while sufficient time remained to make a protective reference, but none was made.
5. The claim remained one under section 63. Estoppel could not provide an independent, non-statutory cause of action; it operated as a shield rather than a sword. Costs were dealt with by agreement.

• Lands Tribunal: President George Bartlett QC, judgment dated 30 September 2003, held the compensation reference statute-barred in ACQ/128/2002.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal and upheld the preliminary limitation decision.