Blackpool Football Club (Properties) Ltd v Coope & Anor

Permission is not required to commence proceedings against a court-appointed receiver who has left office. The appointing court retains supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that the receivership is properly concluded, but protection from interference in the performance of the receiver’s duties is required only while those duties continue. A post-termination release from liability is a distinct matter and does not create a general requirement for permission to sue. A discharge order setting a deadline for claims therefore does not ordinarily amount to permission to commence proceedings.

The claimant brought proceedings alleging that the defendants, formerly court-appointed receivers, had negligently sold assets at an undervalue. The receivership had been discharged and the defendants had been released from claims arising from it unless proceedings were commenced by a specified date. The claim was issued before that deadline, but the defendants later argued that permission was required because they had been officers of the court. The application concerned only whether the claimant required permission to continue the proceedings.

1. Permission after termination of office. The authorities establish a requirement for permission where proceedings concern the conduct of a receiver who remains in office. The rationale is that possession of the estate is treated as possession of the appointing court, and the court must control matters affecting the continuing receivership and protect its officer from vexatious claims. That rationale does not extend to an ex-receiver who has no active duties and where the court no longer has deemed possession of the estate.
2. The court nevertheless retains supervisory jurisdiction after termination of office for matters needed to bring the receivership to a proper conclusion, such as accounts. That supervisory jurisdiction does not require permission before an ordinary claim is commenced against the former receiver.
3. This conclusion was consistent with Re Botibol and with the distinction drawn by Dillon LJ in IRC v Hoogstraten between protection from molestation in the course of current duties and liability for professional negligence after office has ended. The decisions concerning receivers still in office, including Aston v Heron, Re Maidstone Palace of Varieties Ltd and McGowan v Chadwick and Grant, did not require a different conclusion.
4. The discharge order dealt with release from liability and fixed deadlines for instituting claims. It did not grant permission to sue, nor was there any indication that the judge intended a blanket approval of unexamined claims. The claimant’s estoppel argument was unnecessary to decide and, in any event, was unsupported by any identified representation or convention.
5. The proceedings could continue. Any application to strike out or obtain summary dismissal could be made in the ordinary way under Civil Procedure Rules 1998.