Hammond v Commissioner Of Police For Metropolis & Ors

Under the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992, “work equipment” is not every object involved in an employee’s work. Regulation 2’s definition must be read with regulation 4, which confines the employer’s duties to equipment provided for use, or used, by employees at work. The Regulations generally cover equipment supplied to enable work, but not an object supplied by a third party on which the employee works. A customer’s car in a garage is not work equipment of the mechanic’s employer. The Regulations impose duties on employers, so a non-employer cannot be liable under them. The appeal was allowed.

The claimant, an experienced police mechanic, injured his hand and wrist when a wheel bolt on a police dog van sheared as he attempted to remove it. He claimed damages for negligence and breach of statutory duty under regulation 6 of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992.

The Mayor’s and City of London Court gave judgment for the claimant against the Commissioner and the Metropolitan Police Authority, subject to a 50 per cent reduction for contributory negligence. The Court of Appeal considered whether the wheel bolt was “work equipment” and whether the second defendant, which was not the claimant’s employer, could be liable under the Regulations.

The appeal was allowed unanimously. The finding that the wheel bolt was work equipment, and the resulting statutory liability, could not stand. The second defendant also could not be liable under the Regulations because it was not the claimant’s employer.

1. Statutory context. The Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992 implemented the Work Equipment Directive. Article 2 supplied a broad definition, but Article 3 indicated that the Directive concerned equipment made available by an employer to workers. Regulation 2 defined “work equipment” and “use”, while regulation 4 determined the relevant ambit of the employer’s obligations. Regulations 5 and 6 addressed suitability, selection, use and maintenance. Regulation 6 imposed strict liability, subject to contributory negligence, where the item was within the Regulations.
2. Scope of the Regulations. The expression “work equipment” referred to equipment provided by an employer, or used with the employer’s permission, to enable employees to carry out their work. The phrase “tools of the trade” was illustrative, not exhaustive. The Regulations did not extend to an object on which the employee was working when it had been supplied by another person. The provisions concerning suitability, selection and use supported that conclusion.
3. Application. The police van belonged to the second defendant rather than the claimant’s employer. It might have been work equipment for a police officer driving it, but it was not work equipment for the mechanic repairing it. The wheel bolt therefore fell outside the statutory scheme, and the statutory claim could not succeed.
4. Authorities. Kelly v First Engineering Ltd [1999] SCLR 1025 was distinguishable because the track appeared to belong to the pursuer’s employers. The Court reserved the question whether that was a valid distinction and stated that, if it were not, it would respectfully disagree with that decision. Wallace v Balfour Beatty Rail Maintenance Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 72 and Griffiths v Vauxhall Motors Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 412 did not materially bear on the issue. Stark v Post Office [2000] ICR 1013 was relevant to the strict nature of regulation 6, not to the scope of “work equipment”.

Lord Justice Brooke added that much clearer language would be needed to impose such wide-ranging obligations in relation to third-party apparatus. The formal order was: appeal allowed.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) allowed the appeal on the ground that the wheel bolt was not “work equipment” under the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1992. The wider ground did not arise.
2. Mayor’s and City of London Court, on 23 February 2004, entered judgment for the claimant against the first and second defendants on liability, with damages subject to a 50 per cent reduction for contributory negligence.