Scott, R. v

A trial judge may authorise witness anonymity after balancing the witness’s safety against the accused’s ability to prepare and present the defence. A voir dire is not invariably required. It may be appropriate where the defence genuinely disputes that a witness is afraid, but the procedure remains within the judge’s discretion.

The jury must assess all disputed evidence. A judge cannot direct it to accept an accused’s account merely because another witness’s evidence has been rejected. A summing-up must fairly and accurately put the defence case, but need not rehearse it uncritically. Minor inadmissible remarks and alleged disclosure failures do not make a conviction unsafe unless they could materially affect trial fairness.

The applicant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court of murdering Phillip Parris by shooting outside a public house. The prosecution alleged a joint enterprise in which the applicant attacked the deceased with a machete while another participant fired the fatal shots. The applicant denied any joint enterprise and maintained that he was the intended victim.

Two eyewitnesses gave evidence anonymously and from behind screens. On renewing his application for leave to appeal against conviction, the applicant challenged that ruling, the summing-up, the treatment of his and other witnesses’ evidence, the joint-enterprise direction, the refusal to discharge the jury, and disclosure.

1. Application for leave to appeal refused. The conviction was safe and none of the grounds disclosed an arguable error.

2. The Recorder had conducted a careful and proper exercise of discretion in permitting two witnesses to give anonymous evidence behind screens. He followed the guidance in R v Garry Taylor [1995] Crim LR 253, assessed the risks of reprisals, considered alternatives, and examined the effect on the defence and the jury.

   A voir dire is not an automatic requirement. It may be appropriate where the defence asserts that alleged threats do not exist and that a witness is not genuinely afraid. Whether to hold one remains for the trial judge. On these facts, the defence’s opportunity to investigate and prepare its case was not materially impaired.

3. The Recorder should desirably have directed the jury to approach anonymous evidence with care and to consider independent support, consistently with Doorson v Netherlands 22 EHRR 330. The omission did not undermine safety. There was independent evidence, including the applicant’s admitted lies in interview, and the judge had properly directed the jury that anonymity bore no relevance to guilt.

4. The judge could not direct the jury to accept the applicant’s account of a telephone conversation merely because he had advised it to disregard the other participant’s evidence. Assessment of the applicant’s evidence remained a matter for the jury.

5. The summing-up fairly and accurately put the defence case. It was not required to repeat it blandly or uncritically. The prosecution had advanced the applicant as a principal participant in the alleged joint enterprise, and there was no basis requiring a separate alternative case that he was only a secondary party.

6. The applicant, who had previous convictions, was not entitled to a full good-character direction. The judge’s direction that he had no convictions for violence was sufficient. The isolated description of him as a troublemaker had no material impact on the trial’s integrity, and the refusal to discharge the jury was unassailable. The requested identification-parade video and immigration material had not been shown capable of undermining the prosecution or assisting the defence.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction was refused: [2004] EWCA Crim 1835.

• Central Criminal Court: The applicant was convicted of murder on 14 February 2002 and sentenced to life imprisonment on 15 February 2002.