Grant, R v

Defendants jointly charged should ordinarily be tried together. Severance is exceptional and is required only where a fair trial cannot otherwise be secured. Relevant evidence called by a co-accused does not itself make a joint trial unfair, provided the defendant can answer it or test it and the jury receives clear directions on its permitted use.

A defendant’s reliance on the privilege against self-incrimination cannot be held against him. A direction excluding the relevant evidence entirely from the prosecution case against that defendant may adequately protect that right. A Watson direction should generally follow the standard wording, but a carefully framed addition is permissible where it creates no pressure on the jury and does not render the convictions unsafe.

After a trial at the Central Criminal Court, Jason Grant was convicted of murder and conspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm. He received life imprisonment for murder and a concurrent sentence of ten years for conspiracy.

The prosecution alleged that Grant and door staff went to an address intending to assault a man in retaliation for an incident at a public house, but fatally attacked the wrong occupant. Grant denied participating in the killing and blamed a co-accused.

On appeal, Grant challenged the refusal to sever his trial after a co-accused introduced evidence of an earlier alleged knife incident. He also challenged a modified Watson direction given after lengthy jury deliberations.

1. Appeal dismissed. The trial judge was entitled to refuse severance. Persons jointly charged, especially alleged conspirators or parties to a joint enterprise, should normally be tried together. Separate trials are exceptional and remain subject to the overriding requirement that every defendant receive a fair trial.

2. The earlier restaurant evidence was relevant and admissible in the cut-throat defence. Grant had an opportunity to answer questions about it and to cross-examine the witnesses called by his co-accused. His entitlement to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination did not make the continued joint trial unfair. The judge directed the jury not to treat his refusal to answer as evidence and, more favourably still, to disregard the restaurant evidence altogether when deciding whether the Crown had proved the case against him.

3. The jury could follow the direction to consider each defendant separately and place evidence in evidential compartments. The circumstances were materially different from R v O'Boyle (1991) 92 Cr.App.R 202, where a confession which the prosecution could not have adduced had reached the jury through a co-defendant. There was no irremediable prejudice here, and ample other evidence supported the convictions.

4. The judge’s addition to the standard Watson direction was not erroneous. Judges should generally use the standard wording without additions, but that is not an inflexible rule. After more than forty-nine hours of deliberation, the addition merely stated that a qualifying majority which had reached agreement must return verdicts. It was preceded by a clear reminder that the jury faced no pressure of time. The subsequent unanimous guilty verdicts were not unsafe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Appeal against conviction dismissed in [2004] EWCA Crim 2910.
• Central Criminal Court: Grant was convicted of murder and conspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and to a concurrent term of ten years for conspiracy.