Richardson, R v

Under Juries Act 1974, section 18, a verdict is not unsafe merely because a juror was disqualified from service. The court will interfere only where direct evidence, or a proper inference from the evidence, shows that the defendant may have been prejudiced or may not have received a fair trial.

That inquiry applies equally to unanimous and majority verdicts. A majority verdict, and the disqualified juror’s criminal record or probationary status, do not alone establish prejudice. The unusual approach in R v Salt should be confined to its facts where it differs from that established approach.

The applicant was convicted at the Crown Court at Isleworth, by a majority of 10:2, of six counts of rape and one count of indecent assault. He received concurrent sentences of 12 years’ imprisonment for each rape and two years’ imprisonment for the indecent assault.

His sole ground of appeal concerned a juror who had been made subject to a Community Rehabilitation Order before the trial and was therefore disqualified from jury service under the Juries Act 1974. The jury-service check had occurred before the juror’s convictions, and no further check followed the earlier deferral of his service.

The central issue was whether the presence of that disqualified juror rendered the majority verdicts unsafe.

1. Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed. The court held that the juror’s disqualification did not itself make the convictions unsafe.

2. Section 18 of the Juries Act 1974 prevents a verdict being stayed or reversed merely because a juror was not qualified under section 1. Applying the approach in R v Bliss (1986) 84 Cr App R 1, R v Chapman and Lauday (1976) 63 Cr App R 75 and R v Spencer (1985) 80 Cr App R 264, the relevant question was whether there was direct evidence, or evidence permitting a proper inference, that the applicant might have been prejudiced or had not received a fair trial.

3. Section 18(1) applies to both unanimous and majority verdicts. Parliament’s provision for majority verdicts in section 17 meant that the possibility that the disqualified juror formed part of the majority did not, without more, make the verdicts unsafe.

4. The juror’s convictions for sexual offending and offences under the Vagrancy Act, his presence on the sex offenders register, and his probationary status supplied no basis for inferring that he could not honour his oath as a juror. There was no evidence of a miscarriage of justice.

5. R v Salt (Times LR, 1 February 1996) was confined to its unusual facts. To the extent that its approach differed from the earlier authorities, the court preferred the earlier approach.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): In [2004] EWCA Crim 2997, granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal against conviction.

• Crown Court at Isleworth: On 29 July 2003, convicted the applicant by a majority of six counts of rape and one count of indecent assault, and imposed concurrent custodial sentences.