William S, R. v

A jury must deliberate free from improper pressure. A conviction may be unsafe where there is good reason to think that pressure or exhaustion, rather than rational discussion and genuine satisfaction of guilt, produced the verdict.

Before giving a Watson direction, a judge should normally seek the foreperson’s view on whether further deliberation may produce agreement. That is desirable guidance, not an inflexible rule. The question is whether the circumstances show undue pressure. Ordinary debate, argument and persuasion within the jury’s deliberations do not amount to such pressure.

Following a retrial at the Crown Court at Durham, the appellant was convicted by a 10–2 majority of indecency with a child, alleged to have been committed against his granddaughter.

The jury received a majority direction after reporting that it could not agree unanimously. When later recalled to receive an answer to an evidential question, it was given a Watson direction without first being asked whether it could reach agreement. It subsequently returned a guilty verdict by a 10–2 majority.

The appeal against conviction raised one issue: whether the omission of a preliminary inquiry into the prospect of agreement was a material irregularity which created improper pressure on the jury.

1. Appeal dismissed. The omission of a preliminary inquiry did not amount to a material irregularity and did not render the majority verdict unsafe.

2. The court applied the starting point in Watson, (1988) 87 Cr App R 1: jurors must be free to deliberate without pressure, whether from promises, threats, inconvenience or expense. A verdict should be set aside where there is good reason to think that pressure or exhaustion, rather than rational discussion, caused the jury to decide as it did.

3. The procedure recommended in Rose, [1982] WLR 694, is generally desirable. Before a final Watson direction, the judge should ordinarily ask the foreperson whether further discussion may lead to agreement. That step assists the judge in avoiding both unnecessary deliberation and undue pressure. However, as Payne made clear, the guidance is not an inflexible rule.

4. Here the jury had returned to court in order to receive an answer to an evidential question that had arisen during deliberations. Until it had considered that answer, its foreperson could not realistically say whether deadlock continued. It was therefore sensible to give the direction which the judge had already decided to give, and then permit further deliberation.

5. There was no evidence of undue pressure. The judge set no time limit, told the jury that it could report an inability to agree, and allowed substantial time for deliberation. The eventual change which enabled a 10–2 verdict could not properly be treated as the product of improper pressure rather than rational persuasion. The circumstances were materially different from Wharton, [1990] Crim LR 877.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appeal against conviction was dismissed: [2004] EWCA Crim 443.
• Crown Court at Durham: On 11 June 2003, following a retrial, the appellant was convicted by a 10–2 majority verdict of indecency with a child.