Mee, R v

A travel restriction order under section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 must serve its statutory purpose of preventing or reducing the risk of reoffending after release. It is not a substitute for the custodial sentence.

The sentencing court must make a realistic assessment of risk from the circumstances of the offence and offender. If an order is needed, its duration must be proportionate, balanced and tailored to the individual. The restriction’s effect on employment, family life and overseas residence is relevant, although the statutory revocation and suspension regime may reduce the weight of those consequences. Sentencers should give concise reasons for both making an order and fixing its duration unless the reasons are clear from the exchanges at sentence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to importing 1.955 kilogrammes of cocaine from Jamaica. On 1 September 2003, he received seven years’ imprisonment and a 15-year travel restriction order under section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001.

He did not challenge the custodial term or the conclusion that future travel created some risk of reoffending. His appeal concerned only the length of the post-release prohibition on leaving the United Kingdom. The court considered the proper exercise of the statutory discretion and whether 15 years was proportionate on the facts.

Disposition

1. The appeal was allowed. The 15-year travel restriction order was quashed and replaced with an order lasting five years. The seven-year custodial sentence was not challenged.
2. Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 confers a broad discretion, but it must be exercised for its statutory purpose and proportionately. Its purpose is to prevent or reduce the risk of post-release reoffending. It must not be used to supplement the punishment represented by the appropriate prison term.
3. The court must consider the offence and the offender in order to make a realistic assessment of the risk that freedom to travel will facilitate further drug trafficking. Importation alone does not necessarily establish that risk. Relevant circumstances may include the scale and sophistication of the importation, travel to source countries, and established overseas and domestic drug-trade contacts.
4. Where an order is justified, its duration must protect the public without imposing a greater restriction than the assessed risk warrants. The period should be tailored to the offender, taking account of age, previous convictions, the degree of risk, family connections and employment. Restrictions on travel may affect work, family life and residence abroad, but Parliament contemplated those effects and provided relief through section 35 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001.
5. The sentencing judge had properly identified a risk: the appellant had deliberately travelled to Jamaica, had established a connection there, and had contacts at both ends of a sophisticated importation. However, his good character and personal mitigation placed the risk towards the lower end of the scale. A significant restriction was justified, but 15 years was not. Five years was proportionate.

The court further advised that, unless the sentencing exchanges clearly disclose both the need for an order and the period selected, the judge should give succinct reasons for each.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal against the duration of the travel restriction order and substituted a five-year order.
• Sentencing court: On 1 September 2003, following a guilty plea to importing cocaine, imposed seven years’ imprisonment and a 15-year order under section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001.