Williams, R v

When considering a travel restriction order under section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, a sentencing court must make an individual and proportionate assessment of the offender’s risk of reoffending after release. It must balance any reduction of that risk against the order’s adverse effect on the offender and family life. A finding that the offender acted as a courier does not by itself establish a post-release risk sufficient to justify the order. Although the statute does not require reasons, judges should give them as good sentencing practice.

The appellant pleaded guilty at the Crown Court at Croydon to being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on importing cocaine, contrary to section 170(2) of the Customs & Excise Management Act 1979. She received eight years’ imprisonment and a two-year travel restriction order, to take effect after her release.

She appealed only against the travel restriction order. She contended that the judge had not established a sufficient risk of reoffending and had not adequately considered the effect of preventing her from visiting her husband in Jamaica.

1. Appeal allowed to this extent. The Court quashed the two-year travel restriction order.

2. Section 33 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 gives the sentencing court a broad discretion. Following the guidance in R v Mee [2004] EWCA Crim 629, it must be exercised proportionately where an order is appropriate to reduce the risk of reoffending after release.

3. The decision whether to impose an order, and its duration, requires a focused assessment of the particular offender’s post-release risk. That assessment must be balanced against the adverse consequences for the offender and family life.

4. The judge had found that the appellant was a courier, but had made no finding that she would, or could, reoffend after serving a lengthy sentence. Nor had there been a detailed evidence-based assessment of the effect on her family life of being unable to visit her husband in Jamaica. The order was therefore unjustified.

5. Although section 33 does not impose a statutory duty to give reasons for making an order, the Court stated that judges should always give reasons as a matter of good sentencing practice.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed the appeal against the travel restriction order and quashed that order.

• Crown Court at Croydon: Sentenced the appellant to eight years’ imprisonment and imposed a two-year travel restriction order.