Chohan v The Law Society

An appellate court hearing a disciplinary appeal should conduct a rehearing and may substitute its own decision, while according appropriate respect to the tribunal’s assessment. It should not apply an excessively restrictive standard of review.

A breach of professional obligations may constitute conduct unbefitting a solicitor without dishonesty or moral turpitude. In assessing penalty, the court must distinguish deliberate or dishonest misconduct from an unintentional but inexcusable breach. Public confidence remains important, but fairness requires restraint where there is no guilty mind and the solicitor has an otherwise unblemished record.

The claimant, a solicitor, appealed under the Solicitors’ Act 1974 against a decision of the Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal. He had admitted conduct unbefitting a solicitor after authorising a copy of a child witness interview recording to be made in breach of an undertaking, without realising that he had signed an undertaking.

The Tribunal suspended him for six months and ordered him to pay costs. The central issues were the appropriate appellate approach and whether suspension was proportionate in circumstances involving no dishonesty, deliberate breach or moral turpitude.

1. The appeal was allowed. The Tribunal’s suspension was set aside and replaced with a financial penalty of £2,500.

2. The court adopted the approach described in Langford v Law Society [2002] EWHC (Admin) 2802. The appeal was by way of rehearing. The court was entitled to substitute its own decision, while according appropriate respect to the Tribunal’s decision-making. The more restrictive approach associated with Bolton v The Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 was no longer appropriate, particularly after the Human Rights Act 1998.

3. The Tribunal was entitled to consider the possible consequences of the breach and to describe the claimant’s conduct as extremely foolish and unacceptably relaxed. Those findings did not establish dishonesty or moral turpitude.

4. Conduct unbefitting a solicitor may be committed without moral turpitude. Standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness should only be found to have been breached where that is admitted or proved. The claimant’s conduct was unintentional but inexcusable: he ought not to have signed an undertaking without understanding its nature.

5. Deliberate or knowing breach of an undertaking, especially for personal gain or litigation advantage, would warrant severe punishment. This case was materially different. The absence of a guilty mind required restraint, reinforced by the claimant’s limited experience, unblemished record, reliable references, remorse and the absence of any finding that the child’s identity had entered the public domain.

6. The public reputation of the solicitors’ profession remains an important consideration, as explained in Bolton v The Law Society. However, the present case could not fairly be used to send a general deterrent message about deliberate breaches. Suspension was plainly too severe.

The Law Society was ordered to pay the claimant’s costs in the appeal, summarily assessed at £11,945.37. The costs below remained as ordered.

1. Solicitors’ Disciplinary Tribunal: Following the claimant’s admission of guilt, imposed six months’ suspension and costs of £1,750.74.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): Allowed the appeal, set aside the suspension and substituted a £2,500 financial penalty under Solicitors’ Act 1974 [2004] EWHC 1145 (Admin).