Huntingdon Life Sciences Group Plc & Ors v Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (Shac) & Ors

Summary judgment or strike-out is inappropriate where a claimant has a strong case but the defendants retain a real prospect of defending the claim, or where another compelling reason supports a trial. In claims under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the claimant must establish a real danger of loss or harm warranting injunctive relief. The court may then tailor the injunction to protect legitimate interests, including by restraining otherwise lawful conduct where reasonably necessary. The burden remains on the claimant throughout. The scope of representative proceedings, the effect of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, and the discretionary nature of an injunction may be fact-sensitive matters requiring a full trial.

Huntingdon Life Sciences Group Plc and Huntingdon Life Sciences Ltd, together with Brian Cass representing their employees, sought relief against SHAC, individuals and other animal-rights associations. The claim alleged a continuing campaign of harassment, intimidation and unlawful conduct directed at HLS employees, suppliers and customers.

Interim injunctions had previously been granted and continued pending trial. The relevant defendants applied to strike out the defence or obtain summary judgment. They disputed personal involvement in recent unlawful conduct and raised issues concerning representative proceedings under CPR 19.6, the statutory basis of the claim, Convention rights and the width and necessity of the injunction.

1. Applications refused. The claimant had a formidable case and the court would have exercised its discretion to grant interim relief on the same basis as Gibbs J. However, the relevant defendants had not been shown to have no real prospect of a successful defence.
2. Under section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, once an injunction is justified by evidence indicating a real danger of loss or harm unless the defendant is restrained, the court may focus on the claimant’s needs when determining the form and scope of relief. An exclusion zone may restrain conduct which is not itself tortious, such as travelling on a public highway, where reasonably necessary to protect legitimate interests. The burden of establishing the case remains on the claimant.
3. There were triable issues as to whether the relevant defendants had personally participated in, or incited, unlawful conduct during the preceding two or three years, as opposed to legitimate direct action. The effect of the evidence, the defendants’ subsequent conduct and the significance of prior convictions could not properly be resolved summarily.
4. There were also substantial issues concerning the application of CPR 19.6 to the employees and SHAC, the implications of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, the effect of later statutory powers available to the police, and the discretionary assessment required before granting a final injunction. These matters were fact-sensitive and provided a compelling reason for trial under CPR 24.2.
5. The trial was not to become a platform for political arguments about animal rights or the legality and merits of HLS’s business. It would proceed on the assumption that HLS was legally entitled to conduct its activities within the statutory framework. The existing injunction was to continue pending trial, subject to minor revision and further case-management directions.

This was a first-instance decision. The judgment records that the Court of Appeal had granted permission to appeal against an earlier interim order, but that appeal was abandoned.