Burris v Azadani

The High Court and county court may restrain otherwise lawful entry into an exclusion zone where an arguable cause of action exists and the restraint is reasonably necessary to protect the claimant against apprehended tortious conduct. Such orders require very good reason. They must reconcile the claimant’s need for effective protection with the defendant’s freedom of movement and extend no further than necessary.

An injunction remains binding until revoked on appeal or varied or discharged by the court. It must therefore be obeyed even if it ought not originally to have been granted.

The defendant persistently harassed, threatened and contacted the plaintiff after she rejected his efforts to establish an intimate relationship. On an ex parte application, the county court granted an interlocutory injunction restraining harassment and communication and prohibiting the defendant from coming within 250 yards of the plaintiff’s home.

After earlier breaches had resulted in suspended imprisonment, Judge Copley found that the defendant had twice deliberately cycled within the exclusion zone. He imposed four weeks’ immediate imprisonment and activated the earlier suspended sentence of eight weeks.

The defendant appealed, principally contending that the court lacked power to restrain his otherwise lawful use of a public highway. He also challenged the activation of the suspended sentence.

1. Appeal allowed in part. Sir Thomas Bingham MR, with whom Millett LJ and Schiemann LJ agreed, held that neither statute nor authority precluded an interlocutory injunction creating an exclusion zone. The injunction and the four-week sentence remained in force, but the order activating the earlier suspended sentence of eight weeks was set aside.

2. Under section 38(1) of the County Courts Act 1984, the county court could make any order available to the High Court. Section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 conferred a power to grant an injunction whenever just and convenient. Although the claimant had to demonstrate at least an arguable cause of action, an interlocutory injunction was not confined to restraining conduct that was itself tortious or otherwise unlawful. It could adopt a wider form where reasonably necessary to protect the claimant’s legitimate interests and make the court’s procedures effective.

3. An exclusion zone should be imposed only for very good reason. The court must reconcile the defendant’s liberty with the claimant’s right to effective protection. No restraint should exceed what is necessary to protect the claimant’s rights. An ordinary injunction against the apprehended tort will usually suffice, but a wider restraint may be justified where approaching the claimant’s home creates a real risk of entry, abuse, harassment, watching or besetting.

4. Patel v Patel [1988] 2 FLR 179 did not establish a general prohibition against exclusion zones. Its removal of the zone reflected the triviality of the particular dispute and the absence of any need for that restraint. Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727 likewise made no ruling that exclusion zones were impermissible.

5. The defendant had not applied to vary or discharge the injunction and remained bound to obey it. An injunction operates until revoked on appeal or by the court, whether or not it should originally have been granted. His deliberate breaches merited four weeks’ immediate imprisonment. Activation of the suspended sentence was disproportionate because the new breaches were not directed at the plaintiff in the same way as his earlier, more serious breaches.

6. Schiemann LJ added that an exclusion zone must interfere with freedom of movement no more than necessary. He considered that a permanent injunction should ordinarily include liberty to apply, enabling normal rights to resume if the facts no longer justified the restraint.

1. Court of Appeal: The appeal was allowed in part. The exclusion-zone injunction and four-week sentence were affirmed, but the order activating the earlier suspended eight-week sentence was set aside.

2. Wandsworth County Court, Judge Copley: Two deliberate breaches of the exclusion zone were proved. The defendant was committed for four weeks and ordered to serve an earlier suspended sentence of eight weeks, producing an immediate term of 12 weeks.

3. Wandsworth County Court, Judge Walker: Earlier breaches were proved. Concurrent sentences of eight weeks were imposed and suspended until 26 October 1996.

4. Wandsworth County Court, district judge: An ex parte interlocutory injunction restrained harassment and communication and prohibited the defendant from coming within 250 yards of the plaintiff’s home, with liberty to apply to discharge or vary it.