Cant v Seton

The High Court has jurisdiction under section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 to grant an injunction, in principle, against a threatened or actual tort. The power is not limited to conduct that is itself tortious or otherwise unlawful. A civil claim under section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 may address an actual or apprehended breach of section 1(1), subject to the course-of-conduct requirement. Jurisdiction alone does not justify relief. An injunction requires an identifiable need and must be just and convenient. Pursuing an appeal after later proceedings for the same relief have overtaken the original application may also constitute an abuse of process.

Lee Cant appealed against Moulder J’s order of 3 June 2019 dismissing his without-notice application for an anti-harassment injunction against Stephen Seton on the sole ground that the court lacked jurisdiction. Permission to appeal was limited to whether the Judge had jurisdiction under section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 or section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997.

After the application, Cant brought County Court proceedings seeking the same relief. Those proceedings were dismissed for failure to comply with orders, and permission to appeal was refused. The Court of Appeal therefore considered whether to remit the matter or determine the merits, and whether an injunction was justified despite the absence of evidence of further violence, threats or harassment.

The appeal was dismissed. Lady Justice Carr held, with Lord Justice Coulson agreeing, that Moulder J was wrong to conclude that she had no relevant jurisdiction, but that dismissal of the application was ultimately correct.

1. Section 3 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 permits civil proceedings based on an actual or apprehended breach of section 1(1). An actual breach may require conduct on at least two occasions under section 7(3). A single identified incident, coupled with evidence of at least one further apprehended breach, could support a claim based on an apprehended breach.
2. Section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 gives the High Court jurisdiction in principle to grant interlocutory or final injunctions where it is just and convenient to do so. That jurisdiction extends to restraining a threatened tort and an actual tort, such as trespass to the person. It is not confined to conduct that is itself tortious or otherwise unlawful. The authorities relied on were Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727 and Burris v Azadani [1995] 1 WLR 1372.
3. Remittal was inappropriate. The Appellant had already had a full opportunity to pursue injunctive relief in the County Court, had not properly availed himself of it, and did not seek remission. The Court therefore considered the substantive application in the interests of justice.
4. No discretionary relief was justified. The later County Court proceedings had overtaken the urgent application, and the failure to disclose them when seeking permission contributed to the appeal being an abuse of process. More fundamentally, there was no evidence of violence, threat of violence or other potential harassment by the Respondent for about 14 months. There was therefore no identifiable need for an injunction, and it would not have been just or convenient to grant one. The same conclusion applied under section 3 of the 1997 Act.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): held that the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the injunction application, but dismissed the appeal because no injunction was justified and the appeal was an abuse of process.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: on 3 June 2019, Moulder J dismissed the without-notice application on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction.