Qazi, R (on the application of) v Secretary Of State For Work & Pensions

Under the child support departure-direction scheme, allowable special expenses must exceed the prescribed weekly threshold before the Secretary of State may consider whether a departure direction would be just and equitable. Monthly expenses cannot be treated as weekly expenses merely because that would produce a fairer result. The threshold and the prescribed descriptions of expenses are distinct statutory requirements.

The court further held that the scheme did not breach Articles 8 or 1 of the First Protocol. Even assuming those rights were engaged and interfered with, the child support regime pursued a pressing social need and fell within the State’s wide margin of appreciation. The court also rejected reliance on section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to produce a different result.

The claimant, the father of two children, sought judicial review of two decisions of the Child Support Commissioner refusing permission to appeal and refusing to set that refusal aside. The underlying issue concerned the refusal of a departure direction in respect of costs incurred in maintaining contact with his children.

The Secretary of State had treated only specified travel costs as allowable special expenses. Those costs amounted to £14.38 per week, below the £15 threshold in the Child Support Departure Direction and Consequential Amendments Regulations 1996. The claimant challenged the statutory construction and relied on Articles 3, 6, 8, 14 and Article 1 of the First Protocol. The central issue was whether the statutory threshold had been satisfied and, if not, whether the resulting refusal was incompatible with Convention rights.

1. Application dismissed. The claimant had not satisfied section 28F(1)(a) of the Child Support Act 1991. The refusal of a departure direction was therefore legally justified.
2. Paragraph 2 of Part I of Schedule 4B and regulation 14 of the Child Support Departure Direction and Consequential Amendments Regulations 1996 identify the relevant descriptions of special expenses. Regulation 19 then provides that expenses within those descriptions count only to the extent that they exceed £15.
3. Regulation 3 requires the amount referred to in regulation 19(2)(a) to be determined as a weekly amount. The phrase allowing a different construction where the context requires does not permit monthly expenditure to be converted into weekly expenditure by reference to fairness or the just and equitable requirement.
4. The statutory scheme did not engage the just and equitable assessment under section 28F(1)(b), because the threshold condition in section 28F(1)(a) had not been met. Expenses outside the prescribed descriptions could not be brought into account by relying on that requirement.
5. The complaints under Articles 3, 6 and 14 failed. The alleged treatment fell well below the minimum severity required for Article 3. Procedural complaints and complaints about reasons could not affect the outcome because reconsideration would necessarily produce the same refusal.
6. Assuming that Article 8 and Article 1 of the First Protocol were engaged and interfered with, the interference was proportionate. The child support regime responded to a pressing social need, and the executive enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation. Those considerations outweighed the claimant’s financial difficulties, the disincentive to contact and the asserted unfairness of the legislation.
7. The proposed construction under section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 could not be adopted. The application was dismissed.

The judgment records that permission for judicial review was granted by Hale LJ after permission had previously been refused on paper and on reconsideration. The claim challenged decisions of the Child Support Commissioner, not a reported appellate judgment.