Attorney General v Mensah

Section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 permits a civil proceedings order where a person has habitually and persistently instituted vexatious proceedings without reasonable grounds. The jurisdiction is discretionary. The court must balance the citizen’s prima facie right to use the civil courts against the protection of others and the administration of justice. An order operates as a filter rather than an absolute prohibition.

For section 42 purposes, employment tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal are courts or inferior courts. The term “court” is not confined to bodies bearing that technical description. It should be construed broadly where necessary to prevent repetitive and wasteful parallel proceedings.

The Attorney General applied under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 for a civil proceedings order against the defendant. The application followed a long history of unsuccessful litigation concerning her removal from the register of midwives, employment, and related discrimination allegations.

The defendant challenged the procedure and sought to reopen the merits of earlier proceedings. The court had to determine whether the statutory conditions were satisfied, whether Part 8 was the appropriate procedure, and whether section 42 extended to proceedings in employment tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal.

1. The court granted the civil proceedings order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The defendant had instituted proceedings habitually and persistently. The volume of proceedings, repeated challenges to the same matters, repeated appeals and reviews, and the almost complete failure of the litigation established that the proceedings were vexatious and without reasonable grounds.

2. The statutory jurisdiction is discretionary. Even where the preconditions are satisfied, the court must balance the citizen’s right to invoke the civil courts against the need to protect other citizens and the justice system from abusive and ill-founded claims. The resulting order is a permission filter, not an absolute bar. The approach in Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759 was applied.

3. The defendant could not resist the application by attempting to reopen the merits of proceedings in which her avenues of appeal had been exhausted. That was impermissible on an application of this kind, consistently with Attorney General v Jones [1990] 1 WLR 859.

4. Part 8 was the appropriate procedural route for an application under section 42, following Attorney General v Cameron [2003] EWCA 2144 Admin.

5. Section 42 extends to proceedings in employment tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Whether a body is a “court” is determined by the nature of its jurisdiction and the way it exercises it, rather than by technical classification. Employment tribunals exercise judicial functions and form part of the judicial system. The authorities, including Attorney General v BBC [1981] AC 303, Peach Grey & Co v Sommers [1995] ICR 549, and Attorney General v Douglas [2001] EWHC Admin 610, supported that conclusion.

6. The order therefore applied to proceedings in employment tribunals, the Employment Appeal Tribunal, the Queen’s Bench Division and other courts. Costs were ordered.