HM Attorney General for England & Wales v Sheikh

An all proceedings order under Senior Courts Act 1981, section 42, is a serious restriction on access to the courts. It is nevertheless available where a person has habitually and persistently, without reasonable grounds, instituted vexatious proceedings or made vexatious applications.

The court must assess the cumulative effect of the conduct and balance the citizen’s prima facie right to litigate against the protection of other parties and the administration of justice. The order operates as a filter rather than an absolute bar. In an exceptional case, an indefinite order may be proportionate, including restrictions covering tribunals, criminal proceedings, representation of others and acting as a McKenzie Friend.

The Attorney General applied under section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 for an indefinite all proceedings order against the respondent, a former solicitor already subject to a civil restraint order. The application followed extensive litigation and repeated findings that her proceedings and applications were vexatious, without merit or abusive.

The respondent did not address the section 42 issues and sought instead to relitigate an earlier property dispute. The central questions were whether the statutory threshold was satisfied, whether an order was justified and proportionate, and what terms and duration were appropriate.

1. Threshold. The court found that the respondent had habitually and persistently instituted proceedings and made applications without reasonable grounds. The history included numerous proceedings, repeated findings of abuse and vexatious conduct, and several certifications that applications were totally without merit.
2. Applicable principles. The court relied on Attorney General v Jones [1991] WLR 859, Attorney General v Barker [2000] 1 FLR 759 and Attorney General v Covey [2001] EWCA Civ 254. The court may rely on findings made in the underlying proceedings, must consider the whole picture and cumulative effect of the conduct, and must balance the right to invoke the court’s jurisdiction against the need to protect litigants and judicial resources. Vexatious proceedings have little or no legal basis, impose disproportionate inconvenience, harassment and expense, and abuse the court process.
3. Discretion and proportionality. The respondent’s conduct had caused substantial cost and inconvenience to other parties and the courts. Earlier civil restraint orders had failed. Having considered Article 6, the court concluded that an all proceedings order was necessary, proportionate and appropriate in this exceptional case.
4. Terms. The order discharged the existing civil restraint order and required permission for civil proceedings, continuation of existing proceedings and applications. It also restricted criminal proceedings, applied to tribunals including the Employment Tribunal and Employment Appeal Tribunal, prohibited acting for another party or as a McKenzie Friend, and covered aliases. The breadth of the order was justified because narrower terms would be difficult to police and the respondent had previously sought to exploit loopholes.
5. Duration and outcome. An indefinite order was justified by the decade-long history and the absence of evidence that the underlying compulsion would be controlled. The court noted that variation could be sought in the future with permission. Lord Justice Coulson made the order in the requested form; Mr Justice Stuart-Smith agreed.