Stevens v South East Surrey Magistrates Court

Section 127 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 limits the jurisdiction to entertain a complaint; it is not an evidential filter once jurisdiction has been established. In an application for an anti-social behaviour order, conduct outside the six-month period may therefore be admitted where it is relevant to the statutory assessment, subject to fairness, reliability and weight. Such evidence is particularly relevant to the necessity for protection under section 1(1)(b) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

The claimant sought judicial review of an anti-social behaviour order made by the South East Surrey Magistrates Court on 16 September 2003. The police relied on documentary hearsay concerning 30 alleged incidents, eight within six months and 22 earlier incidents. The magistrates admitted the evidence and made a two-and-a-half-year order.

The central issue was whether section 127 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 prevented reliance on earlier conduct in proceedings for an order under section 1 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, particularly when assessing necessity.

1. Permission was granted, but the judicial review claim was dismissed.
2. Section 127 of the Magistrates Courts Act 1980 concerns jurisdiction. It does not prevent evidence of earlier conduct being admitted once jurisdiction has arisen in relation to in-time conduct.
3. An anti-social behaviour order requires proof to the criminal standard that the defendant acted in an anti-social manner under section 1(1)(a) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The necessity requirement under section 1(1)(b) involves judgment and evaluation, rather than a separate standard of proof.
4. Earlier incidents may be relevant to necessity and to the form of the order. Their age, consistency, reliability and connection with in-time conduct affect their relevance and weight.
5. Documentary hearsay may be admitted, subject to fairness in the individual case. The evidence here showed a regular and consistent course of conduct continuing into the permitted period and was fairly admitted as relevant to the need for protection.

Hooper J adjourned the claimant’s application to a Divisional Court. The Divisional Court granted permission and dismissed the claim.