Birmingham City Council v Pardoe

Section 21(7) of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 is a genuinely transitional provision. It does not require the court wholly to disregard conduct occurring before 23 September 2014 when considering an injunction under section 1.

For an application based on actual anti-social behaviour, the applicant must prove qualifying behaviour occurring after 23 September 2014. Earlier conduct cannot itself satisfy that requirement, but may be admissible where it helps prove later behaviour, for example as similar fact evidence or to rebut a defence. Earlier conduct may also be relevant to whether granting an injunction is just and convenient.

Birmingham City Council sought an injunction under section 1 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 against Glenn Pardoe and others, alleging prolonged anti-social behaviour directed at elderly and vulnerable people.

The County Court at Birmingham held that section 21(7), which permits account to be taken of conduct occurring up to six months before commencement of Part 1, did not limit the matters relevant to the court’s decision whether an injunction was just and convenient. The appeal concerned whether evidence of conduct before 23 September 2014 was excluded, and whether it could be relevant to proving post-23 September anti-social behaviour.

1. Appeal dismissed. The County Court judge was correct that conduct before 23 September 2014 could be considered when deciding whether it was just and convenient to grant an injunction, but was wrong to hold that it could not also be relevant at the first stage.
2. Section 21(7) of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 operates purely as a transitional provision. It permits reliance on conduct occurring from 23 September 2014, rather than only conduct occurring after Part 1 commenced on 23 March 2015.
3. Where the application alleges actual, rather than threatened, anti-social behaviour, the first condition in section 1(2) requires proof on the balance of probabilities of anti-social behaviour occurring after 23 September 2014. Earlier conduct cannot itself satisfy that condition.
4. Earlier conduct may nevertheless be considered at the first stage where it is otherwise admissible and relevant to proving later anti-social behaviour. It may, for example, constitute similar fact evidence, assist in identifying the perpetrator, or rebut a defence of accident or innocent error.
5. Earlier conduct may also be considered at the second stage when assessing whether it is just and convenient to grant an injunction. It may support an injunction by showing persistent misconduct despite warnings, or militate against one by placing recent conduct in the context of exceptional personal stresses and an otherwise exemplary history.
6. The interpretation contended for by the appellant would produce absurd results at both stages. The ordinary case-management powers under CPR 32.1 are sufficient to exclude stale or irrelevant evidence and prevent disproportionate satellite litigation.
7. The principles in R (Chief Constable of West Mercia Constabulary) v Boorman, although developed under earlier legislation, were applicable to the issue under the 2014 Act. The appeal therefore failed. Counsel were directed to seek agreement on the order and consequential directions.

• High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): dismissed the appeal from the judgment of His Honour Judge Worster given on 18 August 2016 in the County Court at Birmingham.