Camacho, R (on the application of) v The Law Society

Where disciplinary restrictions are required to protect the public, the disciplinary tribunal entrusted with that function should ordinarily impose the restrictions itself as part of the penalty. It should not merely recommend conditions to a separate regulatory body, unless exceptional reasons justify that course. The tribunal’s power under the Solicitors Act 1974 is sufficiently wide to include conditions governing future practice, including indefinite conditions with permission to apply for variation. The Law Society’s separate regulatory powers over practising certificates do not make it bound by a tribunal’s recommendation. A breach of conditions imposed as part of the penalty is a disciplinary offence capable of attracting a separate penalty.

The applicant, a solicitor, appealed against an indefinite suspension imposed by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. In an earlier judgment, the Divisional Court reduced the suspension to 18 months and considered that his return to practice should be subject to conditions. The present hearing addressed representations by the Law Society and the Tribunal concerning the court’s observations on disciplinary procedure, costs, and the Tribunal’s power to impose conditions.

The court declined to revisit its observations on case management and left the costs issue undecided because it had not been necessary on the facts. The central issue was whether the Tribunal itself could and should impose conditions on the applicant’s practice, rather than leave them to the Law Society.

1. Disposition. The court confirmed that the Tribunal had power under section 47 of the Solicitors Act 1974 to impose conditions governing the manner in which a solicitor might practise. The suspension was limited to 18 months, followed by conditions operating for one year.
2. Who should impose conditions. Section 47 conferred a broad power to make such order as the Tribunal considered fit. Where complete suspension followed by restricted practice was the appropriate public-protection penalty, the Tribunal should impose the restrictions itself. Unless exceptional reasons existed, delegating that part of the penalty to the Law Society would be an abdication of the Tribunal’s responsibility.
3. The Law Society’s powers concerning practising certificates under sections 9–18 were distinct from the Tribunal’s disciplinary powers under sections 46–54. The Law Society could not bind itself to follow a Tribunal recommendation and had to decide any later application on the material available at that time. Consequently, a recommendation did not provide certainty that the penalty determined to be in the public interest would be implemented.
4. The Tribunal could police its own order through the Law Society. Breach of a restriction imposed as part of the disciplinary penalty would generally constitute a further disciplinary offence and could merit a separate penalty.
5. The Tribunal could impose conditions for an indefinite period while permitting an application to vary them. Resource implications did not prevent that course where justice and the public interest required it.
6. The court declined to alter its earlier observations concerning case management. It also declined to decide whether the Tribunal had to consider a defendant’s means when awarding costs, leaving that issue for a case in which ability to pay was directly in issue.

1. High Court (Administrative Court). In [2004] EWHC 1042 (Admin), the court allowed the appeal against indefinite suspension, substituted an 18-month suspension, and indicated that conditions should govern the return to practice.
2. High Court (Administrative Court). In the present judgment, the court confirmed the Tribunal’s power to impose those conditions and ordered that they operate for one year after the suspension.