Taylor v The Law Society

A solicitors disciplinary tribunal must itself impose any practice restrictions which it considers necessary as part of a disciplinary sanction. It should not direct the Law Society to place those restrictions on a future practising certificate. The tribunal’s disciplinary jurisdiction is distinct from the Law Society’s regulatory powers under the Solicitors Act 1974.

A restriction preventing sole practice may be justified where a solicitor requires professional support. It should be accompanied by liberty to apply to vary or discharge it. A restriction on operating a client account may properly apply during employment, but it is illogical to prohibit a solicitor from handling client money while practising as a partner.

The petitioner had received an indefinite suspension after findings concerning an accountant’s report, breaches of the Solicitors Accounts Rules and practice without a practising certificate. In 2005, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal terminated the suspension but directed that any future practising certificate should permit practice only in Law Society-approved employment or partnership and should prohibit handling clients’ money.

The petitioner appealed against those conditions. The Law Society cross-petitioned, contending that the tribunal should not have framed the restrictions as conditions on a practising certificate and that a prohibition on handling client money could not sensibly apply to a partner. The central issue was the proper form and scope of post-suspension practice restrictions.

1. The petition and cross-petition were each allowed in part. The SDT’s order was quashed because it purported to direct the Law Society as to conditions on a future practising certificate.

2. Following Camacho v the Law Society [2004] 1 WLR 3037, a disciplinary tribunal which considers that restricted practice is required in the public interest must impose the restriction itself as part of the disciplinary penalty. It should not leave the matter to the Law Society or give the Society directions. The SDT had ample power under section 47(2) of the Solicitors Act 1974 to make an appropriate order itself.

3. The inappropriate form of the SDT’s order did not mean that all restrictions should be removed. Its conclusion that the petitioner should not return to sole practice was justified. The substituted order therefore permitted practice only in employment or partnership, with liberty to apply to the SDT to vary the conditions. This avoided an unduly permanent restriction while preserving protection for the public.

4. The condition requiring Law Society approval of a particular employment or partnership was removed. Whether the Law Society might impose a condition when exercising its separate regulatory powers was for the Society, not the SDT, to decide.

5. A restriction on handling client money was unsuitable for a future partner, since a partner is held out as handling the firm’s client money and has responsibilities under the Solicitors Accounts Rules. The restriction was nevertheless appropriate during employment. The substituted order required that, while employed, the petitioner must not operate a client account.

6. The Law Society retained all applicable regulatory powers. The petitioner was awarded £3,500 costs, representing the bulk of his costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Sir Anthony Clarke MR allowed the petition and the Law Society’s cross-petition in part, quashed the SDT’s order and substituted practice conditions: [2005] EWCA Civ 1473.
• Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal — on 24 March 2005, terminated the petitioner’s indefinite suspension but imposed conditions framed by reference to a future practising certificate.