Cranage Parish Council & Ors v First Secretary of State & Ors

In a statutory planning challenge, the court reviews legality, not the planning merits. A development plan must be read as a whole, but a policy may legitimately be approached in stages where its wording supports a general policy followed by a qualifying proviso. The court should interfere only where the decision-maker adopts a meaning the policy cannot properly bear, fails to consider a material matter, considers an irrelevant matter, gives inadequate reasons, or acts irrationally.

Decision-makers may assess alternatives on a like-for-like basis where they reasonably regard one form of development as preferable. Planning impacts may be considered individually and cumulatively. In planning decisions engaging Convention rights, a fair balance is required, but the absence of the word proportionality is not itself unlawful.

The claimants brought proceedings under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to challenge the Secretaries of State’s decision to allow Scottish Power’s appeal and grant planning permission for extensive works associated with underground natural-gas storage in Cheshire.

The Inspector had recommended dismissal of the appeal, concluding that the proposal’s disbenefits outweighed its benefits. The Secretaries of State disagreed. The claimants alleged failures concerning the development plan, alternative sites and forms of storage, countryside impacts, risk perception, cumulative considerations, reasons, and rights under Article 8 and Article 1 of the First Protocol. The central issue was whether the decision disclosed a public-law error warranting quashing.

1. Claim dismissed. The court’s role under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 was confined to reviewing legality. It was not entitled to substitute its own planning judgment for that of the Secretaries of State. The applicable grounds included legal error, failure to consider relevant matters, consideration of irrelevant matters, irrationality, and inadequate reasons.

2. The development plan had to be read as a whole. Policy PS1 could properly be treated as having a bipartite structure: it gave general support to essential public-service development in the open countryside, subject to the proviso that the development must not conflict with relevant policies or detract from the rural character of the locality. The Secretaries of State were entitled to conclude that the proposal obtained some support from PS1 while conflicting with policy GS6. Their interpretation was one which the policy was capable of bearing.

3. The planning-policy interpretation approach described in R v Derbyshire County Council ex parte Woods was applicable. The court must first decide whether the decision-maker’s meaning is legally open on the words used in context. The approach did not permit a decision-maker to make policy mean whatever was desired. Purpose, underlying objectives, consistency, and the possibility of arbitrariness remained relevant safeguards.

4. The Secretaries of State had adequately considered alternatives. Having reasonably concluded that salt-cavity storage was the preferable form of development for the identified need, they were entitled to consider alternative salt-cavity sites on a like-for-like basis. They had also acknowledged other forms of storage and explained the limited weight given to alternative locations.

5. The decision letter sufficiently addressed construction impacts, the airfield, the gas-processing plant, solution mining, permitted-development rights, risk perception, and the cumulative planning balance. A time-limited construction impact could be treated as not, in itself, contrary to policy GS6, while the proposal as a whole conflicted with that policy. The decision letter had to be read as a whole, including its adoption of relevant parts of the Inspector’s report.

6. The Secretaries of State were entitled to take account of other regulatory regimes, including the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 and the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990, without treating planning control as irrelevant. They could reasonably regard further geological information as likely to be obtained through the safety regime.

7. The balancing exercise was compatible with Article 8 and Article 1 of the First Protocol. Planning decisions require a fair balance between individual interests, the interests of other persons, landowners’ interests, and the community’s interests. The word proportionality need not appear expressly where the substance of a proportionate balancing exercise is undertaken. No unjustified infringement of Convention rights was established.

8. There were no sufficient public-law grounds for intervention. The claim was dismissed. An order for costs was made in favour of the first and second defendants against all four claimants, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed. Permission to appeal was refused, although time was extended for any application to the Court of Appeal.

First-instance judicial review claim under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Permission to appeal was refused, with time extended for an application to the Court of Appeal.