Parker v Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government & Ors

In a challenge under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 288, the court reviews legality, not the planning merits. An outline application is not invalid merely because information required by the development order was supplied or clarified during the appeal, provided the decision-maker has sufficient information to understand and assess the proposal and no relevant prejudice results. Planning judgments about policy meaning, weight, evidence, need, visual impact and conditions belong primarily to the decision-maker, subject to legality, rationality, fairness and adequate reasons. A renewal application must be considered on its intrinsic merits against current policy, without an automatic presumption in favour of renewal.

The claimant applied under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash an Inspector's decision allowing an appeal by the third defendant against refusal of outline planning permission by Rother District Council. The proposal concerned fishermen's cabins, a facilities building, a workshop/store, a dwelling and conversion of two existing dwellings at an angling centre in the High Weald Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty.

The challenge advanced twenty grounds concerning the definition and scale of the development, outline-application requirements, planning policy, evidence, conditions and planning obligations. The central question was whether the Inspector had acted unlawfully in determining the application and whether his reasons and planning judgments were legally adequate.

1. The claim was dismissed. The Inspector's decision was a planning merits decision reviewable only on grounds of law. The multiplicity of grounds did not strengthen the challenge.
2. An outline application and appeal must be assessed in practical context. The application documents, design and access statement, illustrative drawings, evidence and information on scale supplied at the inquiry gave the Inspector sufficient information to understand and assess the whole proposal. Any procedural deficiencies did not invalidate the application or cause relevant prejudice. Section 79 empowered the Secretary of State to determine the appeal, and the Inspector did not misdirect himself on the development order.
3. The Inspector was entitled to treat the scale of the cabins and facilities building as sufficiently understood, notwithstanding an error in describing one design option as substantially lower. The matter remained an outline permission, with detailed scale and other reserved matters left to the local planning authority within the statutory parameters and the information incorporated into the permission.
4. The Inspector lawfully treated the proposed works as minor earthworks rather than an engineering operation requiring a different form of permission. That was a fact-and-degree judgment supported by the drawings and the limited alteration to landform.
5. Policy interpretation and the weight given to material considerations were matters for the decision-maker within the bounds of reasonableness and fairness. The Inspector was entitled to find that the site was an existing site for the purposes of policy EM10, that the proposal would significantly improve its appearance, and that the development was compatible with AONB protection and rural diversification policies. He was also entitled to consider the renewal application on its intrinsic merits, rather than apply an entitlement or presumption arising from the earlier permission.
6. The Inspector's treatment of evidence, previous planning decisions, need for accommodation, the facilities building, conditions, fragmentation, the section 106 undertaking and the four-hour fishing requirement disclosed no error of law. Previous decisions materially different because of changed planning circumstances or controls did not require detailed distinction. The claimant's application was dismissed, with costs payable to the Secretary of State summarily assessed at £9,135.50. Permission to appeal was refused.

First-instance judicial review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The application to quash the Inspector's decision was dismissed. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was refused.