Myles v Director Of Public Prosecutions

A person required to provide a blood or urine specimen under the Road Traffic Act 1988 cannot insist on a defined period, such as 15 minutes, to obtain legal advice before the procedure continues. The right under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to consult a solicitor as soon as practicable does not permit significant delay to the specimen-taking process. Whether access has been provided without delay remains a question of fact and degree. A breach of the reasonable-time guarantee in article 6(1) does not justify treating post-offence appellate delay as a special reason for reducing a mandatory driving disqualification where that would contradict the statutory scheme. Appropriate financial penalties may instead be quashed as just satisfaction.

The appellant was convicted by South Sefton Magistrates’ Court of failing to provide a blood specimen under section 7(6) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The Liverpool Crown Court dismissed his appeal on 26 February 2002, holding that he had been properly required to provide the specimen and that domestic law was binding despite foreign authorities and article 6(3)(c) of the European Convention.

On appeal by way of case stated, the Divisional Court considered whether the Crown Court had correctly preferred the clear domestic authorities and whether, on the facts, the appeal was rightly dismissed. It also considered whether substantial delay in preparing the case stated amounted to an article 6(1) breach and could constitute a special reason affecting the mandatory disqualification.

1. The court answered both questions posed by the Crown Court affirmatively. The domestic law was clear, emphatic and repeated. Under section 58 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, a detainee must be allowed to consult a solicitor as soon as practicable, but that right does not require the police to delay the specimen procedure to any significant extent.

2. The assessment remains fact-sensitive. If a solicitor is immediately available, or a short telephone consultation can be obtained immediately, it may be permitted. A general request for legal advice does not prevent the custody officer continuing the procedure while arranging advice at the first convenient opportunity. The court rejected the proposed fixed 15-minute period.

3. The Canadian and New Zealand authorities were not materially distinguishable in their underlying reasonableness principle, but their application depended on the circumstances of each jurisdiction. Given the unanimity of the English authorities, they offered very limited assistance.

4. The delay in preparing the case stated amounted to a breach of the appellant’s article 6(1) right to a hearing within a reasonable time. The mandatory disqualification could not be reduced through the concept of special reasons. Those reasons concern extenuating circumstances directly connected with the commission of the offence, whereas the delay occurred after the offence and was closer to offender-specific hardship.

5. The appeal was allowed only to the extent that the financial penalty was quashed. The conviction, driving disqualification and costs orders remained untouched. The court declined to certify the proposed point of general public importance.

• Liverpool Crown Court: dismissed the appellant’s appeal against conviction on 26 February 2002.
• High Court (Administrative Court): on appeal by way of case stated, answered both questions affirmatively and allowed the appeal only by quashing the financial penalty.