R v Nicholas Brown

An interim disqualification order made under section 26 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 expires after six months. Its duration is deducted from any later disqualification imposed under the Act. A mistaken belief that the order continued, including one based on inaccurate website information, is not ordinarily a “special reason” for reducing a statutory minimum disqualification. The special-reason exception concerns a mitigating or extenuating circumstance directly connected with the commission of the offence, although a sufficiently exceptional post-offence event may qualify. Personal hardship arising from the offender’s particular circumstances does not satisfy that test.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two dangerous-driving offences and associated offences. A magistrates’ court committed him to the Crown Court for sentence and made an interim disqualification order under section 26 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.

The order expired after six months, but sentencing was delayed. The appellant relied on information appearing on the DVLA website and argued that he had effectively been unable to drive for 19 months. The Crown Court imposed the mandatory three-year disqualification, subject to the statutory six-month adjustment. The central issue was whether the appellant’s mistaken belief and resulting personal hardship amounted to a “special reason” under section 34(1) permitting a shorter period.

1. Appeal dismissed. The three-year disqualification imposed by the Crown Court was lawful. The six-month period served under the interim order was to be deducted administratively under section 26(12) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, as explained in R v Louie Rees [2022] EWCA Crim 1710 at [25].
2. Section 26 provides a temporary disqualification lasting no more than six months. Once that period expires, the driver’s licence again has effect unless a sentencing court imposes a further disqualification. The fact that the DVLA website continued to display that the appellant was suspended did not alter the statutory position.
3. The “special reason” exception in section 34(1) requires a mitigating or extenuating circumstance which does not amount to a defence, is directly connected with the commission of the offence, and is a matter the court ought properly to consider when imposing sentence. Personal hardship peculiar to the offender does not satisfy the test.
4. A post-offence matter can qualify only in a sufficiently exceptional case. R v Anderson [1972] RTR 113 was such an exceptional case, but Harding v Oliver [1973] RTR 497 stressed that it was confined to its particular facts. The present case was weaker than R v Kwame [1975] RTR 106, where a legally enforceable bail condition had prevented driving, and weaker than R v Ibrahimi [2023] EWCA Crim 250 in its practical legal consequences.
5. The appellant’s claimed 19-month inability to drive was personal hardship dependent on his reliance on inaccurate website information. It was not connected with the commission of the offences and therefore was not a special reason. His failure to attend the first sentencing hearing also contributed to the period of delay.
6. The court added that magistrates should explain clearly that an interim disqualification order expires after six months and that, absent a further order, the disqualification then ends.

• Crown Court at Sheffield: The appellant was sentenced on 12 June 2025 to suspended terms of imprisonment and disqualified from driving for three years, subject to the statutory six-month adjustment.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appeal against disqualification was dismissed and the Crown Court’s order stood.