R v Jamieson Green Marshall

A driving disqualification runs from the date it is imposed and cannot be backdated. An interim disqualification is subject to a six-month limit, and the later disqualification is automatically reduced by the period of valid interim disqualification. No separate order or direction is required. Where a sentencing court’s clear intention is frustrated by an unlawful order, the appellate court may quash and substitute a lawful period giving effect to that intention. A purported remittal or committal made without jurisdiction is a nullity. The court may use judicial review and statutory procedural powers to correct the resulting unlawful sentence efficiently.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to dangerous driving in the Magistrates’ Court and was placed under an interim driving disqualification before being committed to the Crown Court for sentence. The Crown Court imposed a 30-month disqualification, intending it to run from the date of the interim order, which had been made 16 months earlier. The case also involved invalid remittal and committal procedures concerning the dangerous-driving offence and a failure-to-surrender offence under the Bail Act 1976. The appeal concerned the correction of the driving disqualification and the lawful disposal of the invalid committal.

Appeal allowed in part. The 30-month driving disqualification was quashed and a disqualification of 19 months and 25 days substituted. The mandatory re-test order remained in force. The unlawful committal for the Bail Act offence was quashed and a six-month conditional discharge substituted.

1. There is no power to backdate the commencement of a driving disqualification. It runs from the date on which it is imposed (para [13]). The sentencing judge’s intention was nevertheless sufficiently clear to enable the appellate court to substitute a lawful period giving effect to that intention (paras [10], [17]-[18]).
2. Under section 26(4) of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988, an interim disqualification ceases after six months. Under section 26(12), a later disqualification imposed for the relevant offence is automatically reduced by the period during which the offender was disqualified under the interim order. The sentencing court need not direct that the period count. The court applied the approach explained in R v Copper [2018] EWCA Crim 1958 (paras [14]-[16]).
3. The Crown Court had no power to remit an offender to the Magistrates’ Court after a valid conviction and committal for sentence. The purported remittal was a nullity, and the dangerous-driving offence remained before the Crown Court (para [5]). A further committal for sentence for that same offence was also a nullity (para [6]).
4. Because the guilty plea to the failure-to-surrender offence preceded the commencement of the Sentencing Act 2020, the earlier statutory committal regime applied. The requirements for committal under section 6(6) of the Bail Act 1976 were not met because the appropriate sentence was necessarily below the three-month maximum. The seven-day suspended sentence was also unlawful because a suspended sentence cannot be shorter than 14 days (paras [7]-[8]).
5. To avoid unnecessary expense and delay, the court reconstituted itself as a Divisional Court, granted permission for judicial review, dispensed with issue and service, abridged time limits, quashed the committal, and directed sentencing under section 66 of the Courts Act 2003 (paras [21]-[24]).

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) [2023] EWCA Crim 964: granted an extension of time and leave to appeal; allowed the appeal to the extent of quashing the 30-month disqualification and substituting 19 months and 25 days. It also quashed the unlawful committal and imposed a six-month conditional discharge.
• Crown Court at Nottingham (16 March 2022): imposed a suspended sentence of 10 months for dangerous driving, a 30-month driving disqualification intended to run from the interim disqualification date, and a concurrent seven-day suspended sentence for failure to surrender.