Lancashire County Council v Taylor & Anor

A tenant’s inability to refer a non-work notice to arbitration before service of a notice to quit does not deny access to a court. The Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 preserves access to the ordinary courts, and the later statutory arbitration satisfies Article 6.

The differing protections for work notices and other breach notices concern substantive security of tenure, not Article 6 procedure. They do not amount to discrimination under Article 14 because the distinction depends on the nature of the breach, not personal status. In any event, the distinction was objectively justified and proportionate to the legislative aim of preventing abuse of work notices.

A tenancy, and a business dependent on it, is protected as a possession only within the limits of domestic law. Article 8 does not prevent eviction enforcing the owner’s property rights.

The County Council sought possession of Pollards Farm, an agricultural holding occupied by Joseph Taylor under a tenancy governed by the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986. The Council relied on Case D in Part I of Schedule 3 after Mr Taylor failed to remedy alleged non-work breaches of his tenancy.

An arbitrator upheld the final notice to remedy and notice to quit. The award was unsuccessfully challenged in the County Court and Court of Appeal. The present possession proceedings raised fresh arguments under the Human Rights Act 1998, including Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of the First Protocol.

The central issues were whether Mr Taylor had access to a court before service of the notice to quit, whether the statutory distinction between work and non-work notices was discriminatory, and whether termination infringed his Convention rights.

1. Access to a court. The 1986 Act did not exclude the ordinary courts before service of a notice to quit. Although the prescribed note on Form 3 suggested that arbitration was the tenant’s only opportunity to challenge the notice, that was an overstatement unsupported by the Act. Mr Taylor could have sought a declaration concerning the alleged breach or the validity of the notice. After service of the notice to quit, Article 9 of the Arbitration Order required relevant disputes to be determined by statutory arbitration, and the arbitrator satisfied Article 6. There was therefore no breach of Article 6.
2. Article 14 and Article 6. The differences between the powers available in work-notice cases and non-work cases concerned the duration and security of the tenancy. They were matters of substantive law, not procedure, and Article 14 could not extend Article 6 into that substantive field.
3. Article 1 of the First Protocol. Mr Taylor’s possession was his tenancy, not the holding itself. The tenancy was always subject to lawful termination under domestic law. His business goodwill was subject to the same limitation insofar as it depended on occupation of the holding. The notice to quit therefore did not deprive him of a protected possession.
4. Article 14 and Article 1 of the First Protocol. The statutory distinction was not based on personal status. It applied equally to every tenant facing the same kind of notice. The distinction was therefore outside Article 14. Alternatively, it pursued the legitimate aim of preventing abuse of work notices, was objectively justified, and was proportionate. The court’s role was supervisory; Parliament was entitled to draw the legislative line and was not required to extend protection to cases for which there was no evidence of a comparable mischief.
5. Article 8. Following Harrow LBC v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43, Article 8 did not prevent eviction carried out to enforce the landowner’s property rights and was not concerned with the tenant’s property rights.
6. Mr Taylor established no breach of a Convention right. It was consequently unnecessary to decide the effect of section 6(2)(b) or the pleas of res judicata and abuse of process. The County Council was entitled to possession, and the counterclaim for damages and declarations was dismissed.

The judgment states that an arbitrator’s award dated 10 March 1998 was unsuccessfully challenged in the County Court. HH Judge Gee dismissed the challenge on 10 September 1999. The Court of Appeal dismissed Mr Taylor’s appeal on 9 February 2001, and the House of Lords dismissed his petition for leave to appeal on 25 July 2001.

This was a first-instance possession decision concerning the Convention arguments raised in the present proceedings.