Southwark London Borough Council v St Brice (St Brice v Southwark London Borough Council)

After a possession order has been made at a fair hearing, the administrative issue of a warrant does not determine the former tenant’s civil rights and need not be preceded by another judicial hearing. The tenant may be required to initiate an application to stay or suspend execution.

Eviction by a local housing authority interferes with the right to respect for the home. It is nevertheless proportionate where possession was judicially authorised, the suspended terms were breached, adequate notice of eviction was given and the tenant retained an opportunity to seek relief before execution. Different County Court and High Court enforcement procedures do not constitute status-based discrimination merely because the landlord selected the County Court.

A secure tenant appealed from Judge Cox’s dismissal in Lambeth County Court of his post-eviction application to set aside a warrant of possession and permit re-entry. A possession order had previously been suspended on payment terms. Following repeated defaults and earlier stays, the local authority obtained a fresh warrant administratively and without prior notice of its application. Both the authority and the court subsequently gave the tenant advance notice of the eviction and advised him that he could apply to suspend it.

The central issue was whether sections 6(1) and 6(3) of the Human Rights Act 1998, together with articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention, required judicial permission and an opportunity for representations before a County Court warrant could issue.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Kennedy LJ held, Chadwick LJ gave concurring reasons, and Rix LJ agreed with both judgments. Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 did not require a local housing authority to obtain judicial permission before the County Court issued the warrant.
2. The possession order had determined the tenant’s civil rights at a fair hearing. Issuing the warrant was an administrative step which implemented that determination. It neither changed the former tenant’s legal status nor made a new determination of civil rights. Article 6 therefore required no automatic further hearing. A person may reasonably be required to initiate a procedure protecting his rights, particularly where a full hearing has already occurred and he possesses the current information relevant to any changed circumstances.
3. Eviction interfered with the right to respect for the home under article 8(1), but the procedure satisfied article 8(2). Proportionality had been considered when possession was ordered. The tenant then breached the suspended terms and accumulated substantial arrears. He received adequate notice and retained the right under section 85(2) of the Housing Act 1985 to seek a stay, suspension or postponement at any time before execution. Routine enforcement did not require the landlord to prove its entitlement again. The procedure was legitimate, proportionate and served the efficient administration of public housing and court orders.
4. The section 85(2) jurisdiction ended upon execution. Thereafter, relief was confined to abuse of process or oppression in executing the warrant, neither of which arose.
5. The different High Court and County Court procedures did not infringe article 14. The tenant had an equal opportunity to obtain a hearing, the procedures were not truly analogous, the choice of forum was not based on a personal characteristic constituting status, and any difference was objectively justified.
6. Adequate and timely notice of eviction remained important so that tenants could obtain advice and apply before execution. The obsolete two-day wording and the typographical error in the warrant request caused no disadvantage. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

1. Court of Appeal: The tenant’s appeal was dismissed unanimously in [2001] EWCA Civ 1138. Permission to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
2. Lambeth County Court: Judge Cox dismissed the tenant’s application to set aside the executed warrant of possession and permit re-entry.