Roberts & Anor v Williams & Anor

Case-management decisions must advance the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly. Where late evidence is material to issues already likely to be tried, the court should generally admit it if prejudice can be addressed by a short adjournment and an appropriate costs order. Excluding the evidence may be an error of principle where it would leave the trial judge with only part of the relevant account. Timetables and court orders remain important, and refusal remains permissible where prejudice cannot be adequately compensated. The appellate court may also revisit admission where circumstances have changed, including where the trial has already been adjourned and no new trial date has been fixed.

The respondents brought proceedings concerning alleged interference with a reserved right of way and counterclaimed in trespass. Shortly before trial, one respondent sought permission to rely on a witness statement containing evidence of telephone conversations with the respondents’ former solicitor, said to support an understanding that the works could proceed if confined to the respondents’ land.

A district judge refused admission because the evidence was late, materially altered the case, had not been pleaded, and threatened the trial date. The appeal to a circuit judge was dismissed. Permission was then granted for a further appeal concerning whether the district judge had erred in principle or exercised the case-management discretion plainly wrongly, and whether the evidence and an associated amendment should now be allowed.

1. Appeal allowed. The governing question was whether the District Judge had erred in principle or exercised the discretion outside the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible, applying G v G [1985] 1 WLR 647 and Tanfern Ltd v Cameron-Macdonald [2002] EWCA Civ 152.
2. Case management required a balance between both parties’ rights to a fair trial under article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Appellate restraint was appropriate in management decisions, as emphasised in Royal & Sun Alliance Insurers plc v T & N Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1964, but the overriding objective required cases to be dealt with justly, fairly and expeditiously.
3. The principle stated in Cobbold v London Borough of Greenford (9 August 1999) was applicable: amendments should generally be allowed so that the real dispute can be adjudicated, provided prejudice can be compensated in costs and the efficient administration of justice is not significantly harmed.
4. The late statement was material to the circumstances in which the works were carried out and to whether permission had been given. Evidence from the other parties would address much of the same issue. Any need to obtain the solicitor’s evidence or consider a potential conflict could be met by a short adjournment, and the additional evidence would not materially lengthen the trial. The District Judge therefore erred in principle by excluding it.
5. By the time of the appeal to this court, the trial had already been adjourned and no new date had been fixed. It was just to permit an amendment, subject to its precise terms, and to allow the evidence to be given at trial. The appellants had caused the difficulty by failing to plead the case earlier.
6. Lord Justice Rix additionally urged mediation and observed that refusal might affect costs in future. That observation was not necessary to the disposition.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — [2005] EWCA Civ 1086: appeal allowed. The court permitted an amendment, subject to its precise terms, and permitted the late evidence to be adduced at trial.
• Swansea County Court: His Honour Judge Denyer QC dismissed the appeal, holding that the District Judge was not wrong and was clearly right.
• District Judge: District Judge Godwin dismissed the application to admit the witness statement because it was late, introduced important new evidence, and jeopardised the trial date.