Tchouamo v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Where appellate jurisdiction is confined to points of law, factual and credibility findings cannot be reopened merely because an appellant seeks to reargue the merits. Permission requires an arguable error of law capable of making a material difference to the outcome. Errors in an appellate tribunal’s factual summary or attribution of submissions do not justify permission where they disclose no such error in the underlying determination. Speculative possibilities of later difficulty on return likewise do not establish an arguable legal error.

The appellant, a Cameroonian national, challenged the refusal of his asylum and human-rights claim. An Adjudicator dismissed his appeal on credibility and risk-on-return grounds. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal dismissed his further appeal, whose jurisdiction was limited by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to points of law. The appellant renewed an application for permission to appeal, alleging factual misreporting by the Tribunal, failure to address grounds challenging credibility, and inadequacy in the risk assessment.

Permission refused. Lord Justice Laws held that the Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s errors in misstating the appellant’s factual case and attributing submissions to the wrong party were plainly unsatisfactory, but they did not disclose any arguable legal error in the Adjudicator’s determination.

1. By section 101 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction was confined to points of law. The relevant question was whether the Adjudicator had made an arguable error of law capable of making a material difference to the result. The Court of Appeal was not permitted to rerun the merits.
2. The Adjudicator’s credibility findings contained no trace of irrationality. The grounds were, in substance, an attempt to challenge the factual assessment by presenting disagreement as points of law.
3. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal had not addressed new evidence concerning the delay in claiming asylum. That omission could not justify permission because the evidence could not have altered the ultimate factual decision. Laws LJ also expressed grave doubts about the proper basis on which the evidence could have been admitted.
4. The risk-on-return challenge was likewise insufficient. The possibility of later difficulty resulting from an unsuccessful asylum claim was speculative. The findings that returnees were not routinely stopped, detained or questioned, and that there was no indication of any recorded connection with the relevant political party, disclosed no arguable legal error.

Lord Justice Lloyd agreed. Permission was refused, with a detailed assessment of costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): refused the renewed application for permission to appeal against the Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s determination, [2005] EWCA Civ 1185.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: on 22 March 2005 dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the Adjudicator’s determination.
• Adjudicator: on 5 December 2003 dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal of his asylum and human-rights claim.
• Secretary of State for the Home Department: refused the appellant’s claim to enter the United Kingdom by decision letter dated 21 January 2003.