Mlauzi v Secretary of State for the Home Department

An Immigration Appeal Tribunal may interfere with an adjudicator’s determination only on a point of law. A disagreement with findings of fact does not confer jurisdiction.

Whether reasons are adequate depends on the evidence and the argument which the adjudicator had to decide. A factual conclusion supported by the evidence, and accompanied by reasons which adequately answer the case advanced, cannot be reopened as an error of law. Where the tribunal has reversed such a conclusion without identifying a legal error, the appellate court may restore the adjudicator’s decision without remission.

The appellant, a Zimbabwean citizen, claimed asylum on the ground that her imputed political opinion placed her at risk of persecution by Zanu-PF supporters. She also relied on article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. An adjudicator accepted her evidence, found that internal relocation would not provide safety and allowed her appeal.

The Immigration Appeal Tribunal allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal, reasoning that the appellant had previously relocated without difficulty and could do so again. She appealed to the Court of Appeal, contending that the tribunal had impermissibly substituted its own factual assessment. The Secretary of State conceded that the tribunal had not identified a point of law, but sought remission on the ground that the adjudicator’s reasoning was inadequate.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to disturb the adjudicator’s factual determination. Section 101(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 permitted an appeal from an adjudicator only on a point of law. The tribunal had instead disagreed with the adjudicator’s assessment of the facts without identifying any legal error. The approach in CA [2004] EWCA Civ 1165 confirmed that statutory limit.
2. Per Latham LJ, the evidence provided abundant support for the finding that the appellant had been in hiding after the attack on her home. Her evidence also explained why staying with her friend or mother did not amount to safe internal relocation. The adjudicator was entitled to accept that evidence and gave a fully adequate answer to the internal-relocation argument actually advanced by the Secretary of State.
3. The adjudicator was not required to answer a materially different case which had not been put before him. No evidence identified by the Secretary of State established that the appellant could live safely elsewhere in Zimbabwe. The proposed inadequacy-of-reasons challenge therefore disclosed no point of law and supplied no basis for remission.
4. Brooke LJ added that the Court of Appeal would be slow to remit comparable cases unless it could see that matters had gone wrong before the adjudicator. Where the dispute concerned only facts which the adjudicator was entitled to determine, a reversal by the tribunal could not stand merely because the tribunal preferred a different factual conclusion.
5. Brooke LJ also emphasised the mandatory appellate filing requirements. Except in the most exceptional cases, every document required for a Court of Appeal hearing must be filed at least seven days before the hearing. Where exceptional circumstances cause default, the Court Office and the other party should be informed promptly. CPR 1.3 requires parties to help the court further the overriding objective.
6. The decision of the adjudicator allowing the appellant’s appeal was restored.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appellant’s appeal was allowed unanimously and the adjudicator’s decision was restored: [2005] EWCA Civ 128.
2. Immigration Appeal Tribunal: On 22 July 2004, the tribunal allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal and reversed the adjudicator’s determination on internal relocation.
3. Adjudicator: On 8 October 2003, the adjudicator accepted the appellant’s evidence and allowed her asylum and human-rights appeal.